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ABSTRACT
VIETNAM IN TURMOIL:
THE JAPANESE COUP, THE OSS, AND THE AUGUST REVOLUTION
IN 1945
By EDWARD TAYLOE WISE
MASTER OF ARTS in History
University of Richmond, 1991
David C. Evans, Thesis Director
World War II brought about the demise of colonialism.

The

Japanese overthrew the French Indochinese government in March
1945.

Their establishment of a puppet government encouraged the

Vietnamese to seek independence.

Ho Chi Minh, who had a

Communist background, was ready to lead his nation, and was
assisted in that undertaking by the United States Office of
Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor of the Central
Intelligence Agency.

This work explores Ho Chi Minh's

nationalist and Communist background along with the role that the
OSS played in his rise to power in 1945.
Primary sources include U.S. Government documents and many
memoirs written by the participants of this period.
It concludes that Ho Chi Minh was first a nationalist and
secondarily a communist.

It also concludes that the United

States had an opportunity in 1945 to greatly influence the course
of Vietnam's history, but failed to do so because of other more
pressing geopolitical postwar problems.
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CHAPTER I
ROOSEVELT AND VIETNAM
Between 1960 and 1975, the United States engaged in a
futile, frustrating, and costly war in Vietnam.

The

tenacious and inexplicable resistance of the Vietnamese to
the militarily superior American forces stemmed from Asian
nationalism that had gradually been gathering strength in
the

late

colonial

era.

Americans,

themselves

once

colonists, should have understood the Vietnamese desire for
freedom.

During World War II President Franklin Delano

Roosevelt was a profound opponent of European imperialism
and, not surprisingly, envisioned a postwar settlement that
would have ended French dominion over Indochina.
1950

onward,

however,

the

concerns

of

overwhelmed American political leaders.
of

Roosevelt's

anti-colonialism,

along

the

Vietnam was

viewed as

cold

war

The ramifications
with

nationalism in far away lands, were ignored.
Chi Minh's

From about

rising

Eventually, Ho

nothing more

than

a

Communist threat, and America soon found itself involved in
a war to contain it.
It is especially ironic that, in light of these facts,
Ho Chi Minh, and his followers, the Viet Minh, received
their first professional military training from the United
States.

A small team of American servicemen, supplied by

the Office of Strategic Services {OSS), were parachuted into
1

2
the jungle of northern Tonkin in July 1945 to assist the
Viet Minh in their guerilla

struggle

against

Japanese troops that were occupying Indochina.

the
Moreover, as

shown herein, actual American military and intelligence
involvement in Vietnam had begun earlier in the war.

The

purpose of this study is to explore these American
Vietnamese relationships and to discuss the Vietnamese
nationalism that, ultimately, had such a staggering impact
on American history.
To understand President Roosevelt's views, a short
review of

Asian

colonialism

is

necessary.

European

economic expansion into Asia during the latter half of the
19th century has been termed neomercantilism.1

The mother

country (in the case of Vietnam, France) brought the colony
into its tariff and commercial orbit.
supplied

the

The

colony

then

more advanced mother country with cheap raw

materials and merchandise that did not compete with the
homeland's products.

The colony provided an outlet for the

mother country's products.

Neomercantilism was, of course,

specifically designed to advance the economic well-being of
the mother country; the interests of the colony were always
subordinate.
1

French economic control of its Southeast Asian

Bert Cooper, John Killigrew, and Norman Lacharite, Case
Studies In Insurgency And Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 19411954 (Washington [D.C.]: Special Operations Research Office,
The American University, 1964), 17. [Henceforth, Cooper] The
authors quote from "Colonial Policy," Encyclopedia of Social
Sciences (New York: Macmillan Company, 1957), 649.

3
empire was administered thr9ugh the Bank of Indochina which,
with its Paris headquarters, controlled all financing and
investment of the Indochinese economy.

High interest rates

on loans to the Vietnamese led many peasants into a cycle of
perpetual indebtedness.

As an American study put it,

It was French policy to hinder Vietnamese business
through petty restrictions and prohibitive taxation.
Vietnamese businessmen were forced to pay higher taxes
than those paid by French entrepreneurs in the same
business; banking rates and interest as well as
business licenses and fees were higher for the
Vietnamese. 2
The French also monopolized the production of salt, alcohol,
and opium in Vietnam, expropriating what had earlier been
Income from the sale of these

native Vietnamese products.

three made up a substantial part of the colony's general
budget.

French business ventures controlled rice

production.

They developed rubber plantations and

established mining and textile industries.
no concern, however, for the
Indochina.

Consequently,

long-term

The French had

development

of

earnings from their various

Indochinese investments were not reinvested in the country.
The

French

in Vietnam.

controlled

all

levels

of

government

The Paris government appointed a Governor

General for a five year term.
regions of Indochina.
Tonkin (northern

He administered all five

These five regions were known as

Vietnam,

sometimes

referred

to

as

Bae Bo), Annam (middle Vietnam), Cochinchina (southern
2

Ibid, 18.

4
Vietnam, sometimes called Nam Bo), Laos, and Cambodia.
Because of the volatility of French parliamentary politics,
colonial governors rarely served out their whole terms of
office.
a

total

For example, between 1892 and 1930
of

twenty-three

Indochina

governors general.3

had

The

governor general appointed advisory bodies that had no
legislative powers and were only consulted on budgetary
matters.

Vietnamese representation in the colonial

administration, in those rare cases where it existed at all,
was of minimal political significance.4
In light of the French strangle hold on Vietnam, it is
not surprising that Roosevelt was a staunch anti-colonialist
in his Southeast Asian policy.

Cordell Hull noted in 1948

that the President had "entertained strong views on
independence for French Indo-China. 115

As early as January

1943, the President had "grave doubts" that Indochina should
be returned to France because he was convinced that France
had relinquished its world power status.6

Referring to the

evils of colonialism, Roosevelt told his son, Elliott,
during the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, "Don't think
3

Ibid., 43.

4

Ibid., 40.

Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York:
Macmillan, 1948), 1595. [Henceforth, Hull]
5

6

"Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes of a Meeting at the White
House," January 7, 1943, Foreign Relations of the United States.
The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968), 514.

5
for a moment • . • that Americans would be dying in the
Pacific tonight, if it hadn't been for the shortsighted
greed of the French and the

British

and

the

Dutch. 117

Roosevelt had no love for France and on November 28, 1943,
he told Stalin that "after 100 years of French rule in
Indochina, the inhabitants were worse off than they had been
before. 118

Stalin concurred, and according to Gardner, "he

did not propose to shed Allied blood to restore French
rule.

11

9

On

January

3,

1944,

Roosevelt reiterated these

sentiments to the British ambassador to the United States,
Edward F. L. Wood, 1st earl of Halifax, telling him
quite frankly that it was perfectly true that I had,
for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indo-China
should not go back to France but that it should be
administered by an international trusteeship. France
has had the country - thirty million inhabitants - for
nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off
than they were at the beginning • . • . France has
milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo
china are entitled to something better than that. 10
Even the Japanese, who occupied Indochina in 1940, had
a low opinion of French rule there.
Foreign

Affairs,

Shigemitsu

Japan's Minister of

Mamoru,

wrote

that

7

Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan
and Pearce, 1946), 115.
"Minutes of Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting," November 28, 1943,
Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Cairo
and Teheran 1943 (Washington, D. c.: GPO, 1961), 485.
[Henceforth, FRUS - Cairo and Teheran]
8

Lloyd c. Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: From World War II
through Dienbienphu, 1941-1954 (New York: Norton, 1988), 39.
9

10

Hull, 1597.

6

French colonial policy was far more reactionary
than that of Britain and the U.S. From the time France
had conquered Annam and Cambodia and made them into
French colonies, her policy had been one of
exploitation. Independence movements were ruthlessly
crushed and the political freedom of the people taken
away from them.11
Roosevelt strongly felt that, after the war, Indochina
should be placed under international trusteeship and receive
full independence as soon as possible.12
Less than two months before his death, Roosevelt was
still

adamantly

opposed

Indochina to continue.
Gaulle.

Roosevelt

was

to allowing

the French

hold

on

He did not like or trust Charles de
disinclined

to

recognize

French

authority or to help them in any way in restore their
position

in Indochina.

At a press conference held on

February 23, 1945, he expressed his concerns about postwar
Indochina and his hope to establish a trusteeship there.

He

noted that
Stalin liked the idea. China liked the idea. The
British don't like it. It might bust up their empire,
because if the Indo-Chinese were to work together and
eventually get their independence, the Burmese might do
the same thing to England. 13
Unfortunately for Indochinese independence, Roosevelt
11 Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan And Her Destiny: My Struggle For
Peace, translated by Oswald White (New York: Dutton, 1958), 209.
[Henceforth, Shigemitsu]
1

2
3

Hull, 1595.

Samuel I Rosenman, compiler, The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-45 Volume, Victory and
the Threshold of Peace. With special material and explanatory
notes (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 562-563.
1

7
died on April 12, 1945, and his successor, Harry
had a more tolerant view of French ambitions.

s.

Truman,

He ignored

Roosevelt's wishes and supported the French as they sought
to regain possession of their colony after the end of the
war.

Truman told de Gaulle that "my government offers no

opposition to the return of the French Army and authority in
Indochina.nu
Truman's decision to follow a hands-off policy was
based on the

fact that

postwar planning
recovery.

was

the central

European

concern of

political

and

American
economic

Europe, with its highly developed industrial

base, had the capability to absorb and use American aid.
American diplomats viewed Southeast Asia as a poor target
for aid as it
was mainly agrarian and seemed almost helplessly
backward. Furthermore, Asia was in the throes of
nationalist upheavals. The colonial empires were
disintegrating and anti-Western sentiment was
widespread.u
This

Europe-first

policy

military decision during

grew

World

out
War

of

America's

II that

Europe was

the decisive theater of world conflict, and that Germany had

Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle:
Salvation, 1944 - 1946, translated by Richard Howard (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1960), 242. [Henceforth, de Gaulle - Salvation]
14

15

Edward R. Drachman, United states Policy Toward Vietnam,

1940-1945 (Teaneck (NJ): Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,

1970), 115. [Henceforth, Drachman)

8

to be defeated first before Japan was beaten.16

General

Joseph W. Stilwell, the commander of U.S. forces in the
China-Burma-India Theatre, considered southeast Asia to be a
"Pauper's Theater" due to the low level of military support
and political concern it received.IT
low priority.

Asia in general was a

Therefore, it was not surprising that the

State Department gave Vietnam a low priority after the war.
The Department issued a Policy statement concerning
Indochina on September 27, 1948, setting forth the dilemma
that the Department faced over taking a firm stand about
Vietnam.
Our greatest difficulty in talking with the
French . . • has been our inability to suggest any
practicable solution of the Indochina problem, as we
are all too well aware of the unpleasant fact that
Communist Ho Chi Minh is the strongest and perhaps the
ablest figure in Indochina and that any suggested
solution which excludes him is an expedient of
uncertain outcome • . • [yet] we have an immediate
interest in maintaining in power a friendly French
government, to assist in the furtherance of our aims in
Europe. This immediate and vital interest has in
consequence taken precedence over active steps looking
toward the realization of our objectives in
Indochina. 18
Maurice Matloff, strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare,
1943-44. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army (Washington: GPO, 1959), 9; and Louis Morton, "Germany
First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II," in
Command Decisions, edited by Kent R. Greenfield, Office of the
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington:
16

GPO,

1960),

11.

Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, edited by
Theodore H. White (New York: Sloane, 1948), 155.
17

u. s. Department of Defense, United States - Vietnam
Relations: 1945-1967, Book VIII (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971),
148-149. Italics mine. [Henceforth, U.S. - Vietnam Relations]
18

9

After

the

alarming gains.

war,

the

French

Communist

Party

made

Since Truman did not want to see the

Communists come into power, he supported de Gaulle.

Also,

the French needed massive American financial aid to rebuild
their fighting forces in Europe.
Secr.etary of State,

So Truman instructed his

Edward R. Stettinius Jr., to talk with

the French ambassador at the San Francisco Conference.
Stettinius, in speaking with Ambassador Georges Bidault,
made it clear to Bidault that the U.S. government
question

French

Furthermore,
makers

in

sovereignty
the

early

over
1950s

did

not

Indo-China.19
American

policy

solicited increased French participation in the

Atlantic Alliance as
rearmament.

well as French approval of German

Because they wanted France to endorse the

treaty establishing the European Defense Community [EDC],
American

officials

avoided

actions that would incur the

wrath of the French National Assembly. 20
America's pursuit of the Europe-first policy in the
postwar era, meant that emerging nationalist struggles in
the rest of the world, for the most part, were overlooked.
Following the Communist victory in China in 1949 and the
"Telegram - The Acting Secretary of State to the
Ambassador in France (Caffery)," May 9, 1945, Foreign Relations
of the United states: The British Commonwealth and the Far East,
1945. Vol. 6. (Washington, o.c.: GPO, 1969), 307. [Henceforth,
FRUS - British]
19

Marianna P. Sullivan, France's Vietnam Policy (Westport
[CT]: Greenwood Press, 1978), 43. [Henceforth, Sullivan]
20

10
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, American policy became
more preoccupied with the Communist threat.

When a

nationalist movement became powerful, as in Vietnam, it was
often

misread as being primarily, or even entirely

Communistic.

This misinterpretation became the foundation

for·America's tragic involvement in Vietnam.
In most respects Vietnamese nationalism was a reaction
to French colonial oppression.

However, its catalyst was

the Japanese occupation of Indochina in 1940 which shattered
the mystique of white supremacy in Asia.
marched boldly

into Southeast

Asia as

The Japanese army
the champion of

anti-colonialism and national liberation, and its military
strength broke the European hold on the Far East.

It is to

this episode in Vietnamese history that we now turn.

CHAPTER II
JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA
The French controlled their colony in Indochina with a
commercial and official population of no more than 42,000,
and this number included all of the wives and children.
They represented less than 0.2% of the total population.1
Approximately 90,000 French army soldiers were stationed in
Indochina to keep order and enforce French rule, but most of
these were natives or colonials.

Therefore, the French

occupiers constituted a very thin and fragile stratum.
France fell

to Germany

in June

1940, and

When

the Vichy

regime friendly to Hitler was established, there was no
political or ideological reason left to restrain Japanese
ambitions in the region.
Japan's

involvement

ambitions in China.

in

Indochina

began

with

its

It defeated the Peiyang forces of the

Ch'ing in 1894-95 and secured a foothold in Manchuria after
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.

It attempted to encroach

on North China through Shantung during World War I.

The

Japanese army, an increasingly independent force within the
Japanese

state,

greatly

feared

the

growing

Nationalist

John T. McAlister, Jr. Viet Nam: The Origins of Revolution
(New York: Knopf, 1969), 102; he quotes from Annuaire Statistique
de l'Indochine, 1936-1937, 25. (Henceforth, McAlisterJ; Chieu Ngu
Vu, "Political and Social Change in Vietnam between 1940 and
1946 11 (Ph.D diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, [WI], 1984),
67. [Henceforth, Vu)
1

11

12
movement of the Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek in
the late 1920s.

After the Mukden Incident of September 18,

1931, staged by young Japanese army officers, Japan quickly
occupied Manchuria and established the Japanese-dominated
state of Manchukuo.

By the winter of 1933 the Japanese army

moved into northern China and occupied Ch'engte (Jehol),
approximately 100 miles northeast of Beijing.
they

In

1935

got Chiang to agree to withdraw his troops from the

Beijing area and began to set up a puppet state in northern
China.

After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7,

1937, outside of Beijing, the Japanese army launched a full
scale invasion of China and quickly took over Nanking,
Hankow, and Canton. 2
The Japanese began to take a serious interest in
Vietnam in the late 1930s because one of Chiang's major
supply routes originated at the Vietnamese port of Haiphong,
approximately 55 miles east of Hanoi.
began to collect
Vietnam's

and

codify

Consequently, they

information

pertaining

to

culture, economy, history, and geography as

rapidly as possible. 3

After the fall of Nanking in 1937,

and Hankow and Canton the following year, Japanese direct
Edwin o. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, Japan (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 249-257. (Henceforth,
Reischauer]
2

3

David
Revolution,"
by Alfred w.
Asia Studies
Marr]

G. Marr, "World War II and the Vietnamese
in Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, edited
McCoy (New Haven (CT]: Yale University Southeast
[Monograph Series No. 22], 1980), 132. [Henceforth,

13
involvement in Vietnamese affairs grew because they realized
they had to cut off the flow of supplies to Chiang's KMT
forces located in Yilnnan.
Chiang relied increasingly upon war materials being
transported via three main supply routes.

One was the Burma

Roac:i, and another was the "red road" from the Ulan Ude near
Lake Baikal in Soviet Union to Ulan Bator in Mongolia.

The

third, and most important route, was the Tonkin Railroad
from Haiphong to Yilnnan. 4
France,

the

Soviet

Supplies obtained from Britain,

Union,

the

United

States

and

other countries permitted Chiang's government to continue
its resistance to Japan after it had withdrawn to Szechwan
province

and

lost

most

of

its

cities

and

industrial

centers. 5
On June 19, 1940, the day after Marshall Georges Petain
asked Germany for an armistice, the Japanese handed an
ultimatum to General Georges Catroux, the Governor General
of French Indochina.

It contained two provisions.

First,

the Tonkin-Chinese frontier was to be closed to the export
of trucks,

gasoline,

materials.

Second,

and

a

Catroux

number
was

to

of

other

admit

war

a Japanese

Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (New York:
Praeger, 1967), 228. [Henceforth, Buttinger]
4

Hata Ikuhiko, "The Army's Move into Northern Indochina,"
translated by Robert A. Scalapino in The Fateful Choice: Japan's
Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941, edited by James William
Morley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980) 155-208.
[Henceforth, Hata]
5

14
military control commission into Tonkin that would supervise
not only the suspension of all aid to China but also the
implementation of the agreement. 6

catroux, who was only

given twenty-four hours to reply, accepted the ultimatum on
June 20, 1940 with the proviso that the Japanese commission
operate in a reserved manner. 7

The French immediately

closed the Tonkin-Chinese border.

Chiang could no longer

receive supplies and materiel via the port of Haiphong.

By

the beginning of July, General Nishihara Issaku had
established several control stations along Tonkin's highways
and railroads to interdict the flow of materiel to Yilnnan.
Over 100,000 tons of Chinese supplies, including 400 tons of
medical supplies and more than a thousand trucks, valued at
$6-8,000,000, were caught at Haiphong by this action. 8
The Petain-Darlan Government, on its knees before
Hitler, surprisingly disapproved of catroux's decision to
capitulate to the Japanese.

It relieved him because he had

failed to consult them, although on June 20, just two days
after Petain had asked for an armistice, the French
government had issued a directive dealing with the loss of
communication between France and its overseas territories.
6

Buttinger, 235; John E. Dreifort, "Japan's Advance into
Indochina, 1940: The French Response," Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies 13 (September 1982): 280. [Henceforth, Dreifort]
7

Georges catroux, Deux Actes du Drame Indochinois (Paris:
Librairie Plon, 1959), 61.
8

Buttinger, 574 n. 10.

15
It gave colonial

officials broad powers that might be

necessary to deal with important policy matters which would
normally be handled in Paris. 9
impossible

for

Catroux

It

was

virtually

to communicate with his superiors

at that particular time anyway because the French
administration was in a chaotic state as it fled south from
Paris to Vichy.
Vice Admiral Jean Decoux assumed command in Indochina
The Petain Government ordered Decoux to

on· July 20, 1940.

negotiate a treaty with Japan.

Despite some foot-dragging

that irked the Japanese, Decoux concluded an agreement with
Nishihara on September 22, 1940, that allowed the Japanese
to occupy certain key sites in Tonkin.

The Japanese also

got transit rights and the use of airfields in northern
Tonkin.

They were allowed to station 6,000 men north of the

Red River, but not more than 25,000 in the whole of
Indochina. 10
The

Japanese

army

authorities in China were still

not satisfied, however, and decided to speed the way for
future concessions by force.
Nishihara

On the same day as the Decoux

agreement, September 22, the Japanese Army in

southern China,

under General Nakamura Aketo, feigned

ignorance of the treaty, crossed the border, and attacked
French garrisons at Dong Dang and Lang Son, approximately 90
9
10

Dreifort, 282.
Buttinger, 236.

16
miles northeast of Hanoi.

The French resisted stiffly,

killing some 800 Japanese, but Dong Dang fell within twenty
four hours and Lang Son fell the next day.

The combat

ceased only after the Emperor issued a personal order to the
troops to stop fighting. 11

The Japanese government later

apo_logized for this action and Nishihara called it a
"dreadful mistake."

Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Shigemitsu Mamoru, later characterized the incident as
follows:
• the Army was guilty of disgraceful behavior. The
entry of troops was to have been a peaceful manoeuvre
but the plan was upset by the intrigues of the senior
staff officers. Staff officers of the occupying
troops, with the connivance of the Army chiefs in
Tokyo, carried out the entry as though it was an
occupation by force of arms, and proceeded to control
the territory in the manner that had become second
nature to them. The fact was the officers were
dissatisfied with the attitude of moderation shown by
Nishihara in the negotiations, and, therefore, just
ignored them. 12
But the Japanese army had made its point, and the French
were put on notice to forego any plans for future resistance
to the Japanese occupation. 13

One reason for this incident

can also be traced to problems within the Japanese army and
its lax military discipline.

The army suffered from the

tendency of junior officers to ignore or dominate their

11

Dreifort, 294.

12

Shigemitsu, 207.

Bernard B. Fall, street Without Joy (New York: Schocken
Books, 1972), 24. (Henceforth, Fall - Street)
13

17
seniors

in

the

decision

making

process."

Hata

has

characterized this problem as a disease that infected the
Japanese army and was "so widespread that the death of the
Japanese empire was inevitable. 1115
The

agreement

between

Japan

and

the

Vichy regime

in Indochina made that area of the world somewhat of an
anomaly in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
After all the propaganda touting "Asia for the Asiatics" and
the end of the white man's domination, French Indochina
stood as a bastion of Western imperialism protected by the
"liberators of Asia."

This was not encouraging to

nationalist aspirations elsewhere in Asia.M

The Japanese

really had little choice, however, because their removal of
the French would have created chaos to Indochina's
government and the economy.

In turn this would have slowed

their time-table of expansion into Southeast Asia and
precipitated

a

drain

on

Japan's

technical

and

administrative staff which she could ill afford. 17

Japan

needed a peaceful Indochina as a secure base of operations
14

For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon see Masao
Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics,
edited by Ivan Morris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969),
109-115, and 382 "Rule of the higher by the lower (gekokuj6)."
15

Hata, 207.

16

Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role In Southeast Asia
Nationalist Movements (Cambridge [MAJ: Harvard University Press,
1953), 23. [Henceforth, Elsbree)
1

7

Ibid., 24.

18
Thus,

and staging area for its expected invasion of Malaya.
the extent

of

Japanese

control

over

each

country

in

the Co-Prosperity Sphere was anticipated to vary "but proper
and suitable forms of government shall be decided for them
in consideration of military and economic requirements and
of �he historical, political and cultural elements
particular to each area," according to a Japanese plan for
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.18
The United States was upset at this turn of events,
even though the Vichy regime really had no alternative but
to conclude an agreement with the Japanese.

Roosevelt

thought this French collaboration with Japan was
inexcusable.

On October 16, 1940, the United States

responded by placing an embargo on sale of steel and scrap
iron to Japan. 19
In reality the Japanese advance into Tonkin was only a
pretext to occupy the entire country.

According to a "Very

Secret"

of

document

entitled

"Outline

Japanese

Foreign

Policy," dated September 28, 1940, it was Japan's objective
R. John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide, eds., The
Tokyo War Crimes Trial - Transcript of the Proceedings in Open
Session, Vol. 5: Pages 9,818 - 12,392 [a/k/a International
Military Tribunal Far East - IMTFE] (New York: Garland Publishing
Inc., 1981), Exhibit 1336: "Secret - Draft of Basic Plan for
Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," by
Total War Research Institute, dated January 27, 1942; Chapter 3
(Political Construction) (1) Basic Plan - Paragraph 2 (b):
12,014. [Henceforth, IMTFE, E(xhibit)#, Document title, & Page #]
18

William L. Langer, editor, An Encyclopedia of World
History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 1152.
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to

penetrate

the

southern

regions

with

the

aim

of

controlling settled areas during a first stage and then "we
should gradually advance into the other areas.

. steps

shall be devised to enable Japan to hold strategic points in
every area 1120

Japan expected to force French Indochina to

cooperate in establishing a "New Order for East Asia," and
to participate with them in "settling the China incident,
but to also have her support the Empire in both military and
economical lines

. [and] accede to the Empire's demands

forming the contents of the political and military agreement
and economical agreement. 1121
serve as a base from which
other

Far

Consequently, Indochina would
the

Japanese

could

strike

Eastern colonies that were held by the Western

colonial powers - the East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and the
Philippines.22
Soon after their troops were permitted into northern
Vietnam, the Japanese expropriated all Chinese businesses in
IMTFE, E628: "JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY - VERY SECRET, 11
dated September 28, 1940; unnumbered sub-paragraph entitled
"Tentative Plan for Policy towards the Southern Regions," dated
October 4, 1940: 6,977-6,978. This is a statement of Japanese
Foreign Policy obtained from the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
20

n IMTFE, E620: "The circumstances surrounding the conclusion
of agreement between Japan and France concerning the advancement
of the Japanese Army into French Indo-China, 11 dated July September 1940: 6,880.
Dreifort, 279; Rima Rathausky, ed., Documents of the
August 1945 Revolution in Vietnam, translated by C. Kiriloff
(Canberra [Australia]: Department of International Relations,
Research School of Pacific studies, The Australian National
University, 1963), iii. [Henceforth, Documents/August Revolution]
22
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Tonkin that were active in trading with Yunnan.
further solidified their hold on the region.

This step

In mid 1941

the Japanese exacted the right to occupy Cochinchina after
settling a border dispute between Thailand and Indochina,
and troops entered the area on July 29.
Thailand were

important

to

Japan

Indochina and

because

rubber,

coal,

iron ore, tungsten, manganese, antimony, tin, and other rare
minerals from these regions were indispensable to the
Japanese economy.n
sources

Thus, Japanese dependence upon Western

for these strategic raw materials would be

significantly

decreased.

The Japanese

also

wanted

to

control the rice and other food supplies produced in the
deltas of the Mekong and Red Rivers.u

Finally, zinc and

coffee were also available in modest amounts.
On August 1 the United States retaliated with a full
scale embargo.

Roosevelt's Executive Order prohibited the

export of materials like wood pulp, metals, chemicals and
related products and, most importantly, petroleum products
especially
fuel.25

those

which

could

be

refined

into

aviation

It froze the assets of Japanese firms doing
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business in the U.S. so that as Shigemitsu put it,
trade between Japan and the U.S. came to a standstill;
economic warfare had grown to full scale. Britain and
the Netherlands took similar steps. Trade, the life
blood of 80 million Japanese, was now lost save in the
occupied territories. Economically the U.S. had within
her grasp the power to strangle Japan.26
Thus, the move into French Indochina had placed Japan in a
more precarious position than before.
occupation of the area was secure.

But the Japanese

In fact, the oil in the

Dutch East Indies was one of the main reasons for the
Japanese drive to secure a base in Indochina.

Faced with

the embargo, the Japanese knew that without access to those
oil fields, their navy would be immobilized, and without the
navy the growth and existence of the Empire would be in
peril.v
For reasons of political convenience, the Japanese left
the administration of Indochina to the French.

Generally,

they made no attempt to influence directly the

domestic

politics of Indochina.

The French administration functioned

much as it had before the Japanese occupation.

They were

allowed to maintain their army as long as they agreed
to

interfere

with

Japanese

not

military operations.u

Consequently, France salvaged a modicum of

honor and

� Shigemitsu, 241.

v Peter M. Dunn, The First Vietnam War (New York: st.
Martin's Press, 1985), 59. [Henceforth, Dunn]
R. Harris Smith, oss: The Secret History of America's
First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley [CA]: University of
California Press, 1972), 320. [Henceforth, R. H. Smith]
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colonial power.
Despite the presence of more than 90,000 French troops
in Indochina, Japan was able to acquire a strategic base in
the area at practically no military cost and to seal off
China's southern border.

Vietnam's air bases were available

for use against China and Southeast Asian countries.

Japan

had virtually unhampered use of Vietnam's ports and harbors
for shipping

raw

materials,

military

supplies,

and

The Japanese

manpower between Japan and Southeast Asia.

also had total control over Indochina's raw materials and
crops. 29
Japan's

advance

into

Indochina

was,

as

noted,

an

important stimulant to Asian nationalism.

When the Japanese

took

European

Singapore

on

February

15,

1942,

colonial dominance in Asia was shattered.

Singapore's

capitulation inspired nationalists in Southeast Asia to seek
their independence because the continuity of foreign power
had been broken by fellow Asians.

Boettcher noted that "The

Vietnamese in particular were encouraged."m

29

Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam
(New York: Dodd Mead & Company, 1970), 21.
30

Thomas D. Boettcher, Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985), 36. (Henceforth,
Boettcher]

CHAPTER III

THE JAPANESE COUP OF MARCH 9, 1945
Beginning in December 1941 the Japanese launched their

invasion of Malaya, the East Indies, and Burma, and their

occupation of Vietnam during these operations
imp�rtant

strategic

advantage.

was

an

Following these

offensives, the Japanese occupation of Indochina was quiet
and uneventful until 1944.

In that year, however, the

growing strength of U.S. forces in the Pacific worried the

Japanese military planners who held responsibility for

Vietnam.

The U.S., having invaded Leyte and destroyed most

position

to

of the Japanese Navy

forces

in

in

October

1944,

was

An

Allied

in

a

disrupt communications between Japanese

Indochina

and

Tokyo.

sea-borne

invasion of Vietnam was feasible as Southeast Asia became
more and more isolated from mainland Japan.

Japanese army

staff officers expected the U.S. to launch an invasion of

Indochina.1

After the fall of Manila on February 5,

however, the Allies decided to advance northward from the

Philippines bypassing Indochina.

When the Allies reopened

the Burmese route to Chungking in January 1945, however, the
Japanese were forced to strengthen their defenses along the

northern border of Vietnam in anticipation of an attack from

j

Nitz, 335; Ralph B. Smith, "The Japanese Period in
Indochina and the Coup of 9 March 1945," Journal of Southeast
Asian studies 9 (September 1978): 278. [Henceforth, R. B. Smith]
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that quarter.

This deployment reduced the number of men in

central Indochina by half and exposed Vietnam to more
American air raids from General Claire L. Chennault's
Fourteenth Air Force. 2
American bombing attacks, which were conducted with
increasing frequency after 1944, damaged much of Vietnam's
transportation system.

The railroad system was destroyed,

and the Mandarin Road, which connected Vietnam's three
regions, was virtually obliterated.

American submarines not

only torpedoed Indochina's coastal shipping but also mined
the entrances to many harbors.

By early 1945 aircraft

carriers arrived offshore and regularly attacked targets of
opportunity throughout Vietnam.3

Adding to the Japanese

sense of urgency were worsening conditions of food supply
for the general population.

Harvests had been poor and U.S.

attacks brought to a standstill the land and ocean shipment
of goods (most particularly rice) from Cochinchina to
Tonkin.

These developments had grievous consequences for

the Vietnamese in Tonkin.

It led to a major famine during

1944-45 in which between one and a half and two million
Vietnamese starved to death because of exceptionally poor
harvests.4
2

Nitz, 336.

3

Marr, 135.

Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese
Peasants Under the French (Cambridge [MA]: The Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, 1973), 130; he translates an
4

25
In the fall of 1944, following the Allied reconquest of
France, de Gaulle and his government in exile returned to
Paris from Algiers to establish a new provisional regime.
Since the Japanese had originally negotiated agreements with
Vichy, they knew that de Gaulle's eclipse of that government
boded ill for their position in Indochina.
Given these circumstances, it is no wonder that the
French in Indochina were becoming restless.

French

resistance to the Japanese occupation became more organized
and overt during the fall of 1944.

In September portraits

of Petain and Vichy Government slogans were removed from
public places.5

Decoux became more reluctant to supply rice

to the Japanese.
Japanese flag.

In Hanoi contempt was shown toward the

Small acts of sabotage, such as the wrecking

of Japanese army transport trucks, began to occur.
were boycotts of Japanese businesses.

There

Pro-Japanese

Vietnamese were coerced or arrested in growing numbers.

The

Japanese also noted that French anti-aircraft units stopped
eyewitness account of the famine by Tran Van Mai, entitled "Who
Committed This Crime?" (Henceforth, Long]; Admiral (Jean] Decoux,
Ai La Barre de L'Indochine: Histoire de mon Gouvernement General,
1940-1945 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1952), 267. [Henceforth,
Decoux] Decoux would later write that U.S. bombing destroyed
maritime lines of communication and practically halted the
shipment of cereals from the south to the north. Although Decoux
spoke in terms of one million dead, the real figure is probably
closer to two million. Newspaper reports at the time used the
higher figure and are generally accepted by the Vietnamese as
being more accurate.
Nitz, 336; quoting from Shizue Maruyama, Ushinawareta
Kiroku [A Lost Record] (Tokyo: Koraku-shobo, 1950), 276.
5

26
shooting at American bombers on raids.6

The French refused

to surrender downed American pilots, became more vociferous
in their condemnation of Japanese rule, and made it no
secret that they would attack the Japanese after the Allied
landings began.7

These acts caused the Japanese to be

concerned about their security.

They also felt that, even

if the landings did not take place, the French still might
take their revenge.
In his memoirs de Gaulle mentions that he had managed
to

persuade

the

British

government

and

Lord

Louis

Mountbatten, British commander in chief in the Indian Ocean,
to grant the French permission to establish a base at New
Delhi, under the command of Lieutenant General Roger
Blaizot,

c.

whose principal mission was to prepare for

Indochina's recapture.8

De Gaulle also stated that several

French authorities in Indochina, including General Eugene
Mordant, had contacted him in Algiers about resistance work
prior to 1945, but he was unable to give them much support
or encouragement until France was liberated.9

6

Thus, there

Ibid., 337.

Archimedes L. A. Patti, Why Vietnam? Prelude to America's
Albatross (Berkeley [CA]: University of California Press, 1980),
j41. [Henceforth, Patti]
7

Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de
:Gaulle, translated by Jonathan Griffin and Richard Howard (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1964), 626. [Henceforth de Gaulle Memoirs]
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27
were few anti-Japanese activities in Vietnam until the fall
of 1944.
In July 1944, however, the commander of French forces
in Indochina, General Mordant, was contacted by a French
officer working with British Force 136 in India, the Asian
ar� of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE - the
British counterpart to the OSS).

In an operation code

named BELIEF I, Major Fran9ois de Langlade was parachuted
into Tonkin during the night of July 6 near Lang Son and
made contact with Mordant in Hanoi. 10

He delivered highly

classified instructions from de Gaulle which asked Mordant
to form a government-backed resistance movement in Vietnam.
This movement would be controlled from outside Indochina and
would mainly be involved in sabotaging shipping facilities
in Indochinese ports. 11

Mordant agreed and, without

informing Decoux of his new plans, requested to retire on
the grounds of age.
General Ayme.

Decoux approved and replaced him with

On September 10, de Gaulle formally appointed

Mordant to head the Resistance.u
Mordant and his superiors in Paris decided to remove
French army forces from the cities so that they could not be
bottled

up

when

the

time

came

to

strike

against

10 Philippe Devillers, Histoire Du Viet-Nam de 1940 a 1952
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952), 118. [Henceforth, Devillers]
11

Patti, 30.

u Patti, 37-39; R. B. Smith, 277.

the

28
Japanese.
and

He began to train his troops for night operations

mountain

warfare.

Mordant,

was

unfortunately,

apparently not adept at concealing the French movements from
the Japanese.

Therefore, it was not long before everyone,

including the Japanese, knew what he was doing. 13

Also,

Mordant was seriously hampered by suspicions that the French
in Vietnam harbored for de Gaulle's Free French.

Many older

colonists hesitated to cooperate with Mordant's organization
because they not only feared that Decoux's informants had
infiltrated it but also that their careers and positions
would be compromised. 14
In the meantime Ayme had informed Decoux about the
Decoux was not happy

existence of Mordant's organization. 15

that Mordant had authority in the eyes of Paris while he
had

to

continue

in

his

position

as

Governor.

Furthermore, he did not like de Gaulle or trust his Free
French movement, so he cabled Paris and tendered his
resignation. 16

For his part, de Gaulle distrusted Vichyites

and refused to work with them.

But in this case he was

forced to order Major Langlade, who in the meantime had
returned to India, back to Indochina.

13

Patti, 38.

14

Cooper, 45.

15

Decoux, 319.

16

Patti, 39; R. B. Smith, 277; Vu, 326.

On his return trip he

29
landed at Dien Bien Phu, which was under French control, and
on November 19, 1944, met in Hanoi with Decoux, who

then

reluctantly agreed to become a front man for Mordant•s
underground."

Eventually, in the fall of 1945, Decoux was

arrested by the French Republic and charged with
collaboration.

He spent almost two years in prison before

being released because of ill health.

He was finally

cleared in March 1949. 18
At the end of October 1944, the Southern Region Army
asked the headquarters of the Indoshina Chutongun (Japanese
Stationary Forces in Indochina, or JSFI) to draft a plan for
future military operations against the French Indochinese
Army. 19

Colonel Hayashi Hidezumi, a member of Lieutenant

General Machijiri Kazumoto•s staff, apparently drew up the
original plan.

It was completed by the end of December. 20

This plan was given the name of Mago Sakusen (Mago Action;
"Ma"

represented

Machijiri). 21

the

initial

of

Lieutenant

General

Meanwhile, Machijiri, who had commanded the

Thirty-eighth Army

since 1942, was replaced by Lieutenant

Patti, 39; Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle For Indochina
(Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 1954), 34.
[Henceforth, Hammer]
17

18

Hammer, 3 o •

19

Nitz, 335.

20

R. B. Smith, 282. Evidence cited by Smith tends to
\suggest that Hidezumi drafted the plan.
21

Nitz, 335.

30
General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu,
to

him.

so

the

was

plan

forwarded

Tsuchihashi, who had previously been in Timor,

took command on December 4 . 22
Upon arriving in Saigon, Tsuchihashi immediately went
He met with Decoux in

on an inspection tour of the north.

Hanoi and immediately realized that the French had no
intention of continuing their collaboration with Japan.

He

quickly understood that Decoux assumed Japan's eventual
Upon his return to

defeat and was merely stalling for time.
Saigon,

he

decided

to

strengthen

his

headquarters

command and change the code name of the coup to "Meigo" (or
"Bright" [Moon] Action) • 23

On

December

29,

1944,

the

Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo learned that they had lost
the battle in Leyte, so the Prime Minister,

Koiso

Kuniaki,

proposed to the Supreme War Leadership Conference that Japan
take

over

Indochina

landing there.

immediately

to

forestall

a

U.S.

The conference members agreed to put off

their decision concerning an armed takeover of Vietnam until
January.24
Saigon was bombed for the first time on January 9, 1945
by B-29's from India.

On January 11 an American fleet

appeared in the South China Sea and sank half of a Japanese
convoy transportating supplies to Japan.
n R. B. Smith, 279.
23

Nitz, 339-40.

24

Vu, 317.

American carrier-

31
based planes bombed Saigon and other Japanese bases along
the coast of Annam on January 12 and inflicted heavy losses.
Saigon's port facilities were badly damaged.25
attacks further encouraged the French.

These

The bombing raids

troubled the Japanese because it "was the first time that
Indochina had been attacked by planes based on carriers in
the Pacific. "26

They thought the attack was a precursor to

invasion, especially since American troops had occupied most
of Luzon Island that same month.27

Prior to that date, the

only known American

the

exerted

pressure

on

Japanese

had

been

by Chennault's land based Fourteenth Air Force

which could only bomb as far south as Vinh, 165 miles south
of Hanoi.

Also, in January 1945, the SOE started dropping

military supplies to the French in Indochina.

The French

unwisely placed these arms in their regular regimental
arsenals in full view of the Japanese.3
On their side the Japanese were not idle.

They made

regular use of radio intercepts and undercover agents to
discover Gaullist activity.

Thus, Japanese intelligence was

well aware of the French preparations for resistance and
began to have concerns about the safety of Japanese troops

25

Ibid., 311.

26

R. B. Smith, 278.

27

Hammer, 38.

28

R. H. Smith, 326.

32
stationed in Indochina. 29
Leaving on January 21 for an inspection tour of all
Japanese units in the country, Tsuchihashi directed his
staff to prepare tactical plans for neutralizing French
power while he was away although the high command had not
yet: made a final decision.

He "planned to keep the existing

administrative system as well as personnel, although
Japanese diplomats would be appointed to the key posts. 1130
The Supreme War Leadership Conference members agreed on
February 1 that
In view of the change in the war situation and the
attitude of French Indo-China, the Japanese Empire,
based on the absolute need of self-existence and self
defence, shall resort to timely independent military
action. The time for resorting to military measures
shall be determined separately. 31
The Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued an order
authorizing the coup against the French for the first part
of March.

They decided to give the French only two hours to

respond to their demands. 32

Even though they might have to

Lieutenant Colonel Sakai Tateki, French Indo-China
!operations Record: 1940-1945, Japanese Monograph no. 25, (Office
lof the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,
Washington, D. c., 1952), 22. [Henceforth, Sakai]
29

30

Nitz, 340.

IMTFE, E661: "THE SUPREME WAR-LEADERSHIP COUNCIL DECISION
1No. 16. RE[:] MEASURES TOWARDS FRENCH INDO-CHINA TO MEET THE
iSUDDEN CHANGE IN THE SITUATION," dated February 1, 1945,
Paragraph I, Sub-Paragraph 1: 7,166.
31

Murakami, 522; she quotes from an official Japanese
:1 history document by Nihon, Boeicho Senshishitsu (Japan, Defense
iAgency, Archives of the War History Office), Sittan Meigo Sakusen
(Sittan and Mei operations), (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1969),
32

33
resort to force, the Japanese resolved that Japan would not
declare

war

"elevate

on

and

France.

support"

They
the

also

were

independence

determined
of

Vietnam

to
to

garner the active support of the Vietnamese for their war
effort.33

Their primary objective in granting independence

wa5. to make Vietnam cooperate more fully with Japan.

In

turn Japan would supply administrative guidance, disguising
it as a voluntary independence.�
On February 20 some French leaders met in Hanoi to
discuss future military action against the Japanese.

The

Japanese had inside knowledge of this meeting and learned
that many of those present had "advocated an immediate armed
attack on Japanese positions.""

This caused them even more

concern for the safety of their forces.

Thus, on February

26, the Supreme War Leader's Conference decided definitely
to proceed with the coup, and on February 28 the Japanese
Imperial Headquarters issued the order to carry out the
Meig6 Operation.�
In a telegram dated March 3 to Shigemitsu, the Japanese
ambassador

to

Vietnam,

Matsumoto

Shun•ichi,

sought

reassurances from Tokyo that the Cabinet would backup his
589-90; Sakai, 24.
33

IMTFE, E661: Paragraph II, Sub-paragraph 4 (a): 7,168.

� Nitz, 342.
" R. B. Sm1'th, 280.
36

Murakami, 521-22; R. B. Smith, 280; Vu, 332.

perilous position.

He requested "a complete liaison with

34

the military authorities. 11 n

into

In the meantime, the Japanese were moving more troops
Indochina.

and Burma.

Most

of these

came from

South China

Earlier in the war the average Japanese troop

strength in Indochina was about 35,000 men.

However, they

had 61,775 troops stationed there at the end of February,

1945. 38

The French were aware of these increased troop

movements, but apparently believed that nothing was going to
happen to them.

Since they continued to control their army,

the French, in their self-deceptive arrogance, were

oblivious to the fact that trouble was indeed all they could

cause the Japanese.

While many of them may have considered

their military to be a reserve force for the Allies, they

tended to overlook the fact that the Japanese were still in
control in Indochina.

The French were convinced that their

army was going to do great harm to the Japanese Army before
the war ended.

Buttinger wrote that "With the decline of

Japanese military power this self-deception increased. 1139
Their blatant preparations for war, however, forced Japan to
take action.

In February 1945, the French began to construct

IMTFE, E662: Telegram, "TO GREATER EAST ASIA MINISTER
sHIGEMITSU. FROM AMBASSADOR MATSUMOTO," dated March 3, 1945:
:1,112.
37

� McAlister, 110.
� Buttinger, 285.

35
defensive positions outside of Saigon, thus telegraphing
their plans to fight the Japanese.

Mordant had advance

warning of the Japanese preparations for action, but chose
to ignore it.

A Vietnamese police official who was an agent

of SLFEO (Section de Liaison Fran9aise en Extreme Orient Far E�stern French Liaison Section) warned Mordant on March
8 that the Japanese were planning to neutralize the French
Because the man was a

Army sometime between March 8 and 10.
civilian, Mordant discounted his story.
exaggerate, he believed.

Civilians tend to

More important, the French

military services had not uncovered any indication of a
coup.�
Japanese preparations were completed on the night of
March 8, 1945.

The next morning, Matsumoto informed Admiral

Decoux that he needed to see him to convey important
instructions that had just been received from Tokyo.

At

6:00 P.M., Saigon time, Ambassador Matsumoto, along with

Consul General Kono, visited Decoux.

They discussed other

matters and then, at 7:00 P.M., Matsumoto handed Decoux an
ultimatum demanding that all French military and police
forces be placed under the command and control of Japanese
authorities.

The French were also ordered to surrender all

communications, transportation, banking systems and
administrative services to the Japanese.
until 9:00 P.M. that night to reply.
� Patti, 74.

Decoux was given

The Japanese

36

ambassador also handed Decoux an already prepared note
acceptance

that

specified

it

had

to

of

be returned,

signed, to Matsumoto by the deadline. Trying to buy time,
Decoux replied with a note asking for a more thorough
discussion of the matter and pledged that French troops
would remain friendly unless attacked.

A Captain Robin,

from the French Navy, who was Commissioner General for
Japanese-French Relations, was given the task of delivering
the note.

He got lost trying to find the headquarters of

the 38th Army and did not deliver it until 9:15.

The

Japanese moved to take over the French government at 9:17
P.M.

and, shortly afterward controlled Saigon. 41
The arrest of Decoux and his men was only the first

step in the March 9 coup.

All French military barracks and

forts throughout Vietnam were simultaneously attacked and
fell with little resistance, although some 1,700 soldiers
were killed. 42
barracks.
Lang

Son,

Lemonnier

Those who surrendered were confined to

Some French troops
the
and

refused

Japanese beheaded
the

to

French

surrender.

At

General

civilian administrator, Governor c.

Auphelle, under the eyes of the defenders when both men
refused to call upon the garrison to surrender. 43

Twelve

thousand men fought for two days before running out of
41

Sakai, 24; Vu, 334.

42

Boettcher, 3 9 •

� Fall - street, 25.

37
ammunition and water.

Hundreds of survivors surrendered,

but the Japanese commander, infuriated by the losses that
the French had inflicted upon his troops, massacred every
last Frenchman.
fate.

They

The troops at Dong Dang suffered the same

surrendered

after

three

days

to

the

same

Japane�e commander who then executed every single man in the
garrison.M
French forces in Tonkin under the command of Lieutenant
General Gabriel Sabattier also put up some resistance.
Sabattier, who had taken the SLEFO agent's warning
seriously, declared a practice "state of alert," and left
Hanoi on March 8 for his field headquarters.

Ayme canceled

the ''alert" on March 9 because he felt it might unduly alarm
the Japanese.

Meanwhile, Sabattier' s action had alerted

Major General Marcel Alessandri who was at Tong just west of
Hanoi.

He immediately broke camp and moved his troops,

about 1000 men, to the northwestern mountainous region of
Tonkin.�
After the Japanese attack, Sabattier and Alessandri's
troops linked up and moved westward to Dien Bien Phu.
Hundreds of troops died during the fifty-seven day retreat.
Marching an exhausting 800 miles to Kunming, China, they
managed to escape from the Japanese.

In a conversation with

General Albert c. Wedemeyer on June 4, 1945, Sabattier
M

Patti, 74-75.

� Ibid., 74.
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estimated that there were 74,000 regulars in the French army
at the time of the coup and that only 6,000 escaped with him
to South China.
2,150 Europeans.

Of those, there were only 320 officers, and
The rest were Indochinese. 46

He also

estimated that at the time of the Japanese coup, there were
approximately so,ooo French men, women, and children in
Indochina. 47
By March 12 the Japanese were in control of all the
main lowland centers in Indochina.

The April 1 American

invasion of Okinawa, however, made it clear to the Japanese
that southern China and Southeast Asia would be bypassed.
Their fears of an Allied attack on Indochina subsided. 48
This coup was an accomplishment for the Japanese army
whose forces were greatly outnumbered by the French.

The

French had a total of 99,042 armed men, of which 74,020 were
regulars, including 19,371 Europeans and 54,649 indigenous
troops.

The remaining forces consisted of local militia

totaling 24,680 men with a cadre of 362 Europeans. 49
Tsuchihashi later recalled that the coup's success was
largely the result of three factors - a lack of French
caution, the choice of date, and the low morale of the
General G[abriel]. Sabattier, Le Destin De L'Indochine:
Souvenirs et Documents, 1941-1951 (Paris, Librairie Plon, 1952),
455. (Henceforth, Sabattier]
46

47

Ibid. ,

48

Marr, 144.

G

McAlister, 110.

8 O.
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French Indochinese Army.�
In summary, the French were shortsighted.

In their

arrogance and self-delusion, they failed to foresee the
Japanese takeover early enough.

The Japanese, however,

moved swiftly to disarm the French and gain complete control
of Indochina.

This successful military strike was to

provoke a rise in Vietnamese nationalism by holding out the
prospect of independence.
Vietnamese history.

� Nitz, 348.

We turn now to that period in

CHAPTER IV
VIETNAM AFTER THE COUP
All French officials, from Decoux down to the lowest
functionary, were either killed, arrested, imprisoned, or
confined to quarters.

Generals Mordant and Ayme were

quick�y arrested as were key businessmen and pro-Gaullists.
Japanese troops moved quickly to seize administrative
buildings and public utilities throughout Vietnam.

They

also took over radio stations, telegraph centers, banks and
industries. 1

Over 750 French civilian prisoners were

ordered to relocate in seven selected cities - Hanoi, Vinh,
Nha Trang, Saigon (with the exception of Cholon), Phnom
Penh, and Vientiane. 2

Because of overcrowding and disease,

400 of these civilians died during their incarceration. 3
French civilians who were not arrested were prohibited from
going out at night.

They were also forbidden to hold

meetings of more than four persons or to walk in groups of

1

Hammer, 38.

IMTFE, E664: Proclamation No. 9, Sub-Paragraph 1, no date
given but was issued between March 10-12, 1945: 7,188-7,189. This
is a group of ten proclamations from the High Command of the
Japanese Army setting forth a series of steps to be taken to
achieve control over the military and administrative
organizations in Indochina.
2

3

Boettcher, 49.
40
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more than four persons. 4

Since the Japanese did not have an

adequate number of administrative personnel to fill all of
the government positions, the Army encouraged French
civilians to remain in their posts and guaranteed to pay
them the same salary if they stayed. 5
M�ny government positions formerly held by Frenchmen
Thus, the Vietnamese suddenly

were given to the Vietnamese.

found themselves in higher positions of authority than they
had ever held under the French.

In the minds of many

Vietnamese, the French had lost all their power.

The

Japanese takeover encouraged the Vietnamese to believe that
finally they might break the chains of bondage under which
the French had kept them for the last hundred years.
Japanese

also

The

freed 8-10,000 political prisoners who had

been incarcerated by the French.
posts in the new government. 6

Many of these assumed

The Japanese coup destroyed

the illusion of French omnipotence and invulnerability.

It

brought down the fa9ade of French authority, and enabled the
Vietnamese to establish a government that was subservient to
the Japanese.
4

IMTFE, E664: Proclamation No. 2, Sub-Paragraphs 4 & 5,
dated March 10, 1946 [sic - typographical error should be 1945]:
7,185. This is a group of ten proclamations from the High Command
of the Japanese Army setting forth a series of steps to be taken
to achieve control over the military and administrative
organizations in Indochina.
5

Nitz, 345.

6

Elsbree, 98.

42

The

Fighting in Hue was still in progress on March 10.
Japanese "rescued" Emperor Bao Dai there.
took him into custody.

That is, they

They were afraid that he might

escape abroad and set up an anti-Japanese nationalist
organization and, since they planned to use him as a puppet,
they made sure he did not leave Vietnam.

Because Bao Dai

thought that the Japanese would force him to abdicate, he
was surprised when they told him that they wanted him as the
head of a new native government.7
On March 11, 1945, Bao Dai was permitted to announce
the independence of Annam.
Tonkin and Cochinchina.

The Japanese retained control of

This declaration was the precursor

to Vietnamese "independence."
Yokoyama

Seiko,

Minister

It had been prepared by

for

Economic

Affairs

of

the

Japanese diplomatic mission in Indochina and later advisor
to Bao Dai.

Bao Dai's declaration of independence abrogated

the Franco-Annamese treaty of 1884 which had provided for a
French protectorate over Annam.8

Bao Dai pledged

cooperation with Japan in the Greater East Asia War.9

On

March 12 the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Indochina
proclaimed
The Japanese army will support any endeavor to satisfy
the eager desire of independence so dear to all the
peoples of Indo-China. • . . and to help their sincere
7

Nitz, 344.

8

Ibid., 345; R. B. Smith, 286.

9

Nitz, 345.
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national movement in conformity with the fundamental
principles of the declaration of Greater East Asia. 10
In June 1945, however, three months after Bao Dai had
declared Vietnamese "independence," the Japanese had not
formally recognized Vietnamese independence, or signed any
treaty with a Vietnamese governrnent. 11

Unfortunately for

the Vietnamese, the Japanese promise of independence turned
out to be hollow. In 1942, during the establishment of the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese had
already decided that "It must also be noted that the
independence of various peoples of East Asia should be based
upon the idea of constructing East Asia as 'independent
countries existing within the New Order of East Asia' and
that this conception differs from an independence based on
the idea of liberalism and national self-determination. "12
At the behest of the Japanese, Bao Dai asked Tran Trong
Kirn,

a

renowned

scholar

known

for

his

textbooks

on

Confucianism, Buddhism and Vietnamese history, to become his
10

IMTFE, E664: Proclamation No. 10, dated March 12, 1945:
7,191. This is a group of ten proclamations from the High Command
of the Japanese Army setting forth a series of steps to be taken
to achieve control over the military and administrative
organizations in Indochina.
Huynh Kirn Khanh, "The Vietnamese August Revolution
Reinterpreted," Journal of Asian Studies 30 (August 1971): 766.
[Henceforth, Khanh]
11

IMTFE, El336: "Secret - Draft of Basic Plan for
Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," by
Total War Research Institute, dated January 27, 1942; Chapter 3
(Political Construction) (1) Basic Plan - Paragraph 2 (b):
12,015. Italics mine.
12
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Prime Minister and form a government. 13

In 1943, Kim had

felt threatened by the French because of his association
with several Japanese experts in Vietnamese studies and his
He

affiliation with a progressive association in Hanoi.
asked the Japanese army to give him asylum.

The Japanese

flew him first to Singapore and then to Bangkok, where he
stayed for most of the war.

On April 17 Kim formed a new

Vietnamese government that lasted until August 25, 1945 • 14
From March until the August Revolution, Vietnam would
enjoy what was called doc-lap banh ve (caricatured cake, or
fake, independence) • 15

Tran

government in name only.
Indochina changed

very

Trong

Kim's

Cabinet

was

a

The political structure of
little. 16

limited political backgrounds.

Kim's

appointees

had

They had only served on

French-created councils or committees, so they had not had
the opportunity to acquire the administrative experience
necessary to operate a government.
incapable of working together
situation.

Kim

to

Consequently, they were
handle

the

chaotic

did, nevertheless, replace pro-French

mandarins in Hue, and his cabinet was able to moderate rice
confiscations, reduce some taxes, and loosen censorship.

By

July his government had persuaded the Japanese to relinquish
u R. B. Smith, 288.
14

Ibid.

15

Khanh,

765.

16

I b'd
1 • ,

766.
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direct administration of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Da Nang. 17
Another result of the Japanese coup was a surprising
upsurge in political involvement on the part of the
Vietnamese throughout the country.

In the first month after

the coup, they were apprehensive about potential Japanese
repression.

Having seen their past political activities

suppressed by French colonial authorities, the Vietnamese
were naturally mistrustful of any foreigners who promised
political freedom.

It soon became apparent, however, that

the Japanese were going to be indifferent towards them as
long as their actions were not anti-Japanese.

The Japanese

Army had decided not to interfere in Indochina's internal
affairs and left the Vietnamese free to do what they
wanted. 18

The Vietnamese soon began to participate openly

and enthusiastically in political discussion.
Political rallies and public demonstrations became
common in the public squares and marketplaces of most towns
and cities.

Throughout Vietnam, as observed by the

periodical Ngay Nay (Today), "after the brief storm of
bullets of March 9, political parties, groups and
associations shot up like mushrooms. " 19
17

Many of these were

Marr, 145.

IMTFE, E663: THE DISPOSITION OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA, Part 3
(The development of the disposition), Sub-Paragraph (h), dated
December 17, 1945: 7,180. This is part of a report relating the
history of the Japanese 38th Army which describes the activities
of the Japanese in Indochina during 1945.
18

19

Khanh, 767; quote from Ngay Nay (Today), June 2, 1945.
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not well organized.

Most had no real ideology or political

program, and their leadership was inexperienced.
however, unabashedly nationalistic.w

They were,

Driven by their anti

colonialist feelings after the coup, few Vietnamese were
inclined to collaborate with their new and "supposed"
saviors - the Japanese.
The famine was an important backdrop to the drama of
the Japanese takeover and rising Vietnamese patriotism.

Its

origins and course require some explanation if we are to
understand the full picture of Vietnam in the critical year
of 1945.
In 1943 the French had introduced an unpopular system
of government purchase of rice.

They paid people only 1.40

piasters for a ten-kilogram container of rice while the
market price was 2.50 to 3.00 piasters.

During the second

yearly harvest in June 1944 the government still paid 1.40
piasters, but the market rate had jumped to 6.00-7.00
piasters.

By the 1944 autumn harvest the market price was

20-30 piasters and rapidly rose to 60-70 piasters, but the
government still only paid 1.40 piasters.21

Having to sell

their crop at such a low price, Vietnamese farmers could not
repurchase the rice they desperately needed to survive.
In mid-1943 the monthly per capita rice ration in the
20

Ibid, 767.

Long, 222-223; he quotes from Tran Van Mai, "Who Committed
This Crime?"
21

47
By the end of 1943 it

towns and cities was 15 kilograms.
was lowered to 12 kilograms.

Four months later it was

reduced to 10 kilograms. After the March 9, 1945, coup it
was cut to 7.

Since the average adult needed at least 12

kilograms of rice to
beginning

continue

functioning,

this

was

the

made

the

the

of starvation. 22

Starting

in

late

farm situation difficult.

1943,

weather

Three typhoons hit the coastal

areas of northern Vietnam (known as Bae Viet) from May to
September 1944 and destroyed the much of the rice crop.
Starvation began to appear in October 1944, and the winter
following was unusually cold.

The most severe period was

between January and June of 1945.
people of Vietnam.

Hunger was not new to the

Under French colonialism, it had become

"a permanent feature of their life. "23

Yet this famine was

the most disastrous one in recent times.

To quote an

eyewitness,
People looked at each other with all hope drained from
their eyes and uttered words that made it seem that
they were saying farewells to one another • . • • They
were so hungry that they had to eat marsh pennywort,
potato leaves, bran, banana roots, and the bark of
trees. The villagers - fathers and sons, brothers and
sisters, husbands and wives, all of them alike - could
no longer save one another. 24
Peasants also
22

Marr, 135.

23

Khanh, 768.

Long, 228; he quotes from Tran Van Mai, "Who Committed
This Crime?"
24

48
began to eat ground paddy husks, . . • grass, herbs,
clover - all the feed that was normally reserved for
their cattle and pigs, all the plants that were not
poisonous, anything that could be swallowed. As the
Viet Nam Tan Bao (New Tribune of Viet Nam) reported: A
dead dog or a dead rat was an occasion for the entire
hamlet to get together and share a few bites.�
Northern Vietnam seldom grew enough rice to feed itself
and was heavily dependent upon the South to supplement its
needs.

The war worsened the problem.

The French in

Indochina had agreed to supply industrial products to the
Japanese war machine.

Peasants were forced to convert large

tracts of arable land in North and Central Vietnam from rice
fields to fields of jute for cordage, and cornfields were
made into fields of peanuts needed for machine oil.26

Hemp

and castor oil plants were also planted for use by the
Japanese.

During the worst of the famine people sometimes

managed to sow a paddy only to die before the crop was
harvested.
In the cities life was not much better.
to the urban areas but still starved.

Peasants fled

Parents tried to sell

or give away their children and, when this stratagem failed,
they abandoned them.

Khanh has written that

Rows of naked peasants, little more than skeletons,
lined the walls, waiting for death to take them away.
At 12:00 noon and 5:00 P.M. daily, oxcarts made their
regular runs. Their mission was to collect dead and
dying bodies piling up on the pavement or at street
corners. These were then dumped - sometimes still
protesting - into mass graves outside the city
25

Khanh, 768-769.

26

Ibid., 768.
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limits.v
The French and the Japanese appear to have done little to
alleviate the disaster.

The Japanese even made Bao Dai

promise, during his independence speech, that the delivery
of regular supplies to the army would continue. 28

The

government of Tran Trong Kim was all but helpless because
the Japanese, fighting a battle to the death in the Pacific,
commandeered as much rice and other supplies as possible. 29
As we have seen, the Japanese coup finally ignited
Vietnamese yearnings for nationhood.

This rise in

nationalism took place during an increasingly serious
famine.

This is one reason why the Japanese could not

expect their occupation to be entirely peaceful.

Though

starving, or perhaps because they were starving, the
Vietnamese began to rise up against the Japanese.

And

there, ready to lead them, was a little known but well
organized movement of long standing, the Viet Minh.
leader - Ho Chi Minh - was an uncommon man with a
charismatic talent for leadership.

v Ibid., 769.
u Ibid.
� Ibid.
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CHAPTER V
THE NATIONALIST, HO CHI MINH, AND THE VIET MINH
Ho
a

Chi

Minh

and

other

Vietnamese

patriots

formed

guerilla organization called the Viet Minh in May 1941 to

fight the Japanese and the French in Vietnam.

Although it

was based on Communist ideology, it basically appealed to
the nationalist sentiment of the Vietnamese people.

A brief

sketch of Ho's ideological development is necessary to show
that his commitment to Communism was, at best, a tactical
Ho said "I am a professional revolutionary • • . . "1

move.

However,

his characterization of himself

expanded

to

could

easily

be

"professional revolutionary patriot" because a

free Vietnam was Ho's overriding passion for most of his
The movement he founded reflected this.

life.

One of his

compatriots, Tran Ngoc Danh, summed up Ho's beliefs in this
manner:
How many times in my life I've been asked: you who know
Ho Chi Minh so well, can you say whether he is a
nationalist or a communist? The answer is simple: Ho
Chi Minh is both. For him, nationalism and communism,
the end and the means, complement one another; or
rather, they merge inextricably. 2
From the perspective of the last decade of the twentieth
century, we know that this is not the paradox it seems to
1

Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper &
Row, 1965), 40. [Henceforth, Shaplen]
Charles Fenn, Ho Chi Minh (London: Studio Vista, 1973),
40. (Henceforth, Fenn] He quotes from (No author cited] Histoire
du President Ho, Foreign Languages Press, Hanoi, 1949, 33.
2
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be.

Nationalism retained its power in many Marxist regimes

and reemerged openly following the relaxation of the Soviet
hold on eastern Europe.

In Vietnam, nationalism was the

stronger of the two from the start of the Viet Minh's
history.
There is no major twentieth century political figure
about whose early life we know so little as Ho Chi Minh.
Many years are a total blank.

His exact year of birth is

uncertain, but 1890 is the most accepted.
month is well established - May 19.

The exact day and

He was born in the

village of Kim-Lien, in the province of Nghe-An, in Central
Vietnam near the city of Vinh.

His original name was

probably Nguyen Sinh Cung but may also have been Nguyen That
Thanh. 3
It is believed that he was the youngest of three
children although not much is known about his family.

His

father was a well-to-do peasant, an ardent nationalist, and
a scholar who later spent the last twenty years of his life
wandering around Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Thailand.
father taught him to read at an early age.

Ho's

Ho learned

French and Cantonese since most books in Indochina at that
time were written in those languages.

Thus, Ho's

Many scholars differ over Ho's original name. It was
either Nguyen Tat (or That) Thanh, or Nguyen Sinh Cung.
According to Bernard Fall in The Two Vietnams (New York: Praeger,
1963), 81: "A perusal of a dozen Communist sources on his
background will produce at least ten different birth
names. • . • "
3
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proficiency with foreign languages dates from his early
youth.

During his lifetime he learned to speak seven or

eight different languages. 4

He is said to have attended
In

Vietnam's best high school, the Lycee Quoc-Hoc, at Hue.
1910 he was dismissed from it for anti-French activities.
He drifted south until he obtained a job as a teacher
private

school

in

the

100 miles east of Saigon.

fishing

village

in

a

of Phan-Thiet,

He soon left that job, moved to

Saigon in 1911, and changed his name to Ba to escape the
scrutiny of the French police. 5
From 1911 to 1915 he wandered around the world as a
cook aboard the French ship Amiral Latouche-Treville.

He

traveled to the United states, and visited Boston and San
Francisco.

Eventually, he settled in Brooklyn, where he

worked as an itinerant laborer and learned to speak
English. 6

In 1915 he was living in London, where he became

interested in the Irish uprising.

He also began to

associate with members of the Fabian Society, a Socialist
movement that had as its goal a democratic Socialist state
in Great Britain.

It advocated an evolutionary Socialism

rather than revolution.

While in London, Ho also read many

books on politics and began to acquire a revolutionary

4

Shaplen, 35.

Bernard F. Fall, The Two Vietnams (New York: Praeger,
1963), 85. [Henceforth, Fall - Two]
5

6

Fenn, 23.
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outlook. 7
In late 1917 he moved to Paris, and it is here that Ho
adopted his other well-known pseudonym, Nguyen Ai Quoc,
which means "Nguyen the Patriot."8

In 1919, during the

Versailles peace talks, Ho, inspired by Woodrow Wilson's
Fourteen Points and call for self-determination, wrote a
letter to Wilson concerning the status of Indochina.

He

included a petition for Vietnamese autonomy entitled
"Claims of the Annamite People."

The petition asked for

representation in the French parliament.

He requested that

7

Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography (New
York: Random House, 1968), 18. [Henceforth, Lacouture]
Throughout his life, Ho used many aliases. Below is a list
of some of those names and the dates in which he used them. This
list is mainly from Chen, 37-38.
8

Nguyen Sinh Cung [or Nguyen Van Cung] (1890-1900)
Nguyen Tat Thanh (1900-1912)
Ba (1912-1917)
Nguyen Ai Quoc (1917-1924, 1930-1933)
Nguyen o Phap (1923-1924)
Ly Thuy [or Li Jui] {1924-1927)
Vuong Son Nhi [ or Mr. Vuong, or Old Vuong] (1924-1927)
Wang Ta-jen [or Vuong oat Nhan) (1926)
Tong Van So {1924-1927)
Thau Chin (1928-1929)
Song Man Cho [or Sung Man-ch'o) {1931-1932)
Linov (1933-1938)
Lin {1934-1938)
P. C. Lin (1938-1940)
Ho Quang [or Hu Kuang) (1938-1940)
Comrade Vuong (1939-1941)
Mr. Tran [or Old Chen] (1939-1940, 1944)
Ho Chi Minh (1940-1969)
Thu [or Old Thu] (1941-1942)
Vuong Quoc Tuan [or Hoang Quoc Tuan] {1941-1942)
Lucius (1944-1945)
Ho Ting Ching (1944)
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there be freedom of the press and freedom to hold meetings
or form associations.

He asked for the release of political

prisoners, and that there be

equality of legal rights

between French and Annamese. 9

Ho rented formal wear and a

bowler hat and tried to deliver his letter to Secretary of
State �obert Lansing on June 18, 1919.
naught.

His attempt came to

He was unceremoniously shown the door because so

many other representatives of the underdeveloped world Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, etc. - were also clamoring for
national recognition and restoration of their boundaries. 10
His attempt to appeal for the rights of his people, however,
attracted the attention of prominent Socialists such as Leon
Blum and he was subsequently invited to the Congress of the
French Socialist Party at Tours in December 1920. 11
On December 25, 1920, the Parti Communiste Fran9ais
(PCF) was formed with Ho as one of its charter members.

By

his own admission, Ho knew little about either Socialism or
Communism, and he joined the PCF because they had befriended
him.
party,

9
1

°

In 1960 he wrote that "I understood neither what was a
a

trade-union,

nor

what

was

Socialism

or

Lacouture, 24.
Fall - Two, 88; Lacouture, 24.

Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking,
1983), 121.
11
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Communism. 1112

However, Ho was profoundly influenced by

Lenin's Theses on the National and Colonial Questions which
Lenin had issued at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920
and that had been published in Paris by L'Humanite.

In his

Theses Lenin stated that Asian Communists not only had to
work with nationalist groups in each country but also had to
organize the peasantry as the primary force in the struggle
to end Western imperialism. 13
After reading this treatise many times, Ho concluded
that ". • • only Socialism and Communism can liberate the
oppressed nations

and

the

the world from slavery. "14

working

people

throughout

It was this document which

attracted Ho to Communism because he believed Lenin's claim
in the Theses that
all the national liberation movements in the colonies
and among the oppressed nationalities • . • are
learning from bitter experience that their only
salvation lies in the Soviet system's victory over
world imperialism. 15
Lenin further explained that the working masses of colonial
countries were being abused by the same capitalists who were
Ho Chi Minh, "The Path Which Led Me To Leninism, 11 in On
Revolution - Selected Writings, 1920-66, edited and with
introduction by Bernard B. Fall. {New York: Praeger, 1967), 5.
[Henceforth, Ho Chi Minh)
12

13 Gary R. Hess, Vietnam and the United States {Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1990), 15.

14

Ho Chi Minh, 6-7.

Robert c. Tucker, ed. , The Lenin Anthology {New York:
Norton, 1975), 621.
15
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exploiting the proletariat in the home country.

Thus,

Lenin's uncompromising attitude toward imperialism was to
have a profound influence upon Ho.

He came to believe that

fate had ordained a Communist strategy to free Vietnam from
the French colonialists, or rather, that Vietnam's fate
could be changed.

As one historian put it,

The Marxist concept included the inevitability of
proletarian victory. It is not without significance
that the Vietnamese expression for revolution - each
mang - means literally "change fate. "16
Ho concluded that only a force as ruthless and brutal as
Communism could generate the force he needed to make his
nationalism succeed.

Ho quickly became disillusioned with

the PCF, however, because of its indifference towards
solving colonial questions despite its verbal declarations
of

support

of

the

colonial affairs. 17

Communist International's program on

He became a spokesman for oppressed

colonial peoples and founded the Intercolonial Union, an
organization of radicals from the French colonies who were
living in France.
In 1923 Comintern leaders invited him to Moscow because
they

thought

revolutionary.

he

showed

uncommon

promise

an

Asian

Ho was soon on good terms with Bukharin,

Dimitrov, Trotsky, and especially Stalin.
16

as

He briefly

Fenn, 41.

I. Milton Sacks, "Marxism In Viet Nam," in Marxism in
Southeast Asia: A study of Four Countries, edited by Frank N.
Trager, (Stanford [CA]: Stanford University Press, 1959), 108.
[Henceforth, Sacks]
17
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attended the University of Oriental Workers (also known as
the Stalin School for the Toilers of the East) which was
founded on the edicts of Lenin's Theses.

This school was a

training ground for Asian and other Third World insurgents.
Here he learned how to turn Communist theory into practice
because
Lenin emphasized that hesitation, weakness, pity,
deviation, reformism and compromise all helped the
enemy. Remembering the goal, the communist could not
shirk the means. Violence wins the revolution;
dictatorship consolidates it. Both require ruthless
leadership. 18
From June 17 to July 8, 1923, he was a delegate to the Fifth
Congress of the Communist International. In October Ho also
was appointed as a PCF delegate to the Peasant International
(Krestintern) where he was elected as the Asian
representative on the Permanent Directing Committee of the
Krestintern.
months • 19

He served in that capacity for eighteen

While in Moscow he wrote a book entitled Le

proces de la colonisation franqaise (French Colonization on
Trial).

It was published in

Paris in 1926 and was an

attack on French colonial policies.

It was smuggled into

Vietnam and became a bible for early Vietnamese
nationalists. 20
In 1925 the Comintern sent Ho to Canton to serve as a
18

Fenn, 46.

19

Sacks, 109.

20

Hammer, 76.
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translator and interpreter for Mikhail Borodin, the
Comintern adviser to Chiang Kai-shek.

Borodin's assignment

was to manage the reshaping of the Kuomintang.

Ho would

later copy Borodin's organizational activity by building a
Vietnamese national revolutionary movement comparable to the
KMT. 21

At this time Canton was a center for Vietnamese

exiles so, in 1925, under Comintern orders, Ho began to
organize the Vietnamese students in South China as the
Revolutionary Youth League (Viet Nam Thanh Nien each Mang

Dong Chi Hoi) which was usually known by its abbreviated
name of

Thanh

Nien

(Youth).

Although

Ho

used

Communist organizational methods and provided it with a
"The most noteworthy feature of the new

Communist core,

organization was its deliberate attempt to appeal to
Vietnamese nationalism. . • . 1122
In 1927 Chiang purged the Communists from the
Kuomintang and thousands were either imprisoned or executed.
Ho escaped and

Thanh

fled

to

Moscow.

Dang

VNQDD

his

absence

the

Nien disintegrated and split into three or four

different factions, one of

Dan

In

was

(Viet
a

which

was

the Viet

Nam

Nam Nationalist Party, or VNQDD).

non-Communist,

Quoc

The

pro-Chinese, revolutionary

nationalist organization that modeled itself after the

21

Sacks, 116.

William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam
(Boulder [CO): Westview, 1981), 19.
22
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Kuomintang.

It would cause trouble for Ho in the future.n

Ho wandered around Europe and Asia for several years
until he settled in Hong Kong where, on February 3, 1930, he
formed the Viet Nam Cong San Dang (Vietnam Communist Party)
from the remnants of the Thanh Nien.

In October, at the

request of the Comintern, it was renamed the Indochinese
Communist Party (Dong-duong Cong-san Dang), or ICP, to
include Laos and Cambodia.�
Meanwhile, during the years 1927-1930 the VNQDD had
become powerful in Tonkin.
to accomplish its aims.

It advocated the use of violence

After the 1929 assassination of an

important Frenchman, the police arrested many VNQDD members
forcing the party to reorganize on the Communist cell
pattern.

At that time its leader, Nguyen Thai Hoc, planned

an armed uprising
would

against

the

French.

He

believed

it

be successful because it would gain the support of

the Vietnamese masses.�
The uprising began on February 9-10 1930, at the Red
River port of Yen Bai in Tonkin. 26

It quickly spread to

twenty-five provinces in all three regions of Vietnam.

The

French conducted a bloody but highly effective purge of both
the Vietnamese Communists and VNQDD members.
n Patti, 530; Documents/August Revolution, iv.
u Patti, 508.
� Ibid., 531.
u Buttinger, 109.

The revolt was
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crushed by mid-1931 and hundreds of Communists were killed
or imprisoned.

According to one soviet account, based on

Vietnamese and French sources, there were 58 executions (22
by guillotine), 61 life imprisonments, and 42 prison
sentences of varying
were

also tried.v

length;

another

576

lesser

leaders

Those who survived fled to China, but

Nguyen Thi Hoc was captured and executed.

Pham Van Dong and

Le Due Tho, later confederates of Ho Chi Minh, spent several
years on the prison island of Poulo Condore.28
Communist leadership died in prison.

Most of the

French action thus

ended the ICP and VNQDD as influences in Vietnam during the
1930s because both movements had
account one

failed to

take into

of Lenin's rules - that a revolution must never

be started until the insurgents are ready to fight to
victory.
As a consequence of the uprising, Ho was imprisoned by
the British in Hong Kong.· During one of his court hearings
he denied that
was

he was

a nationalist. 29

a Communist

and stated

that

he

While in the prison hospital he made

v Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies In Southeast Asia
(Princeton [NJ]: Princeton University Press, 1966), 149; he
quotes from A. Dantzig, Indokitai (Moscow, 1931), 107.
[Henceforth, McLane]
u Poulo Condore (also known as Con Son) is located
approximately 60 miles south of the Mekong River delta. It was
notorious as a concentration camp where the French sent thousands
of political prisoners.
� Dennis J. Duncanson, "Ho-chi-Minh in Hong Kong, 1931-32,"
The China Quarterly 57 (January March 1974): 91.
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friends with many of the staff and
sign a fake death certificate.

persuaded one of them to

With the help of Frank

Loseby, a noted British anti-imperialist, he used the
certificate to escape in mid-1932.

This led to rumors in

the Vietnamese community of Hong Kong and beyond that Ho was
He passed into obscurity for the next five years.

dead.

Ho

finally settled in China sometime after 1938. 30
In May 1941 Ho briefly appeared in Vietnam, returning
to his homeland for the first time in almost thirty years.
From May 10 to May 19, the Executive Committee of the
revived ICP held its Eighth Conference in a cave near Pac
Bo, in the remote Cao Bang Province of northeastern Vietnam.
Ho chaired the Conference, marking his emergence as ICP
leader.

He

and his followers agreed to establish the

Vietnamese Independence League (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh

Hoi) , or Viet Minh Front.31
The Viet Minh's immediate task was to form a "united
front" with non-Communist elements by advocating the broadly
popular goal of national liberation along with socioeconomic
reform.

Its purpose was to unite "all patriots, without

distinction of wealth, age, sex, religion or political
outlook so that they may work together for the liberation of
our people and the salvation of our nation."n
30

Ibid, 99.

31

Fall - Two, 62; Khanh, 772; Patti, 524.

n Lacouture, 75.

The Viet
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Minh stressed

independence

from

foreign

rule.

Its

moderate domestic program, combined with its determination
to expel both the French and the Japanese from Indochina and
establish an independent democratic republic, guaranteed its
widespread appeal to all social classes throughout Vietnam.
The main Viet Minh cadres and leadership were explicitly
Communist from the outset.

Rank and file support came from

trade unions, youth groups, peasant organizations, and, in
due course, nationalist organizations composed of middle
class elements.

As McLane summarized it, the "Vietminh, in

short, had the virtue, from the Communist viewpoint, of
exercising the appeal of a •united front from above' while
organized as a •united front from below.'""
held by the Viet Minh's

The ideology

followers was less Communism than

anti-colonialism and nationalism.

Communism's

anti

colonial stance was the primary source of its appeal to
Vietnamese intellectuals.
anti-colonialism

and

It provided a doctrinal basis for

consequently

independence movement.34

legitimized

the

In this manner, the "Communist

leaders succeeded in keeping the support of many of the non
Communist nationalists."35
nationalist

The French failure to allow a

alternative to the Viet Minh drove moderate

Vietnamese willingly into the ranks of the revolutionary
33

McLane, 261.

34

Cooper, 11.

"Sacks, 102-103.
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movement.

The result, according to I. Milton Sacks, was

that
nationalism became the Vietminh's major ideological
weapon, and with this psychological advantage its mass
support was assured • . • . The Vietminh's emphasis on
organized participation by the whole population • • •
was of major psychological and organizational
importance in its success.36
During most of World War II, Ho directed the Viet

Minh's

activities

from

controlled part of China.

a

safe

haven

inside

the

KMT

For a time, however, he was

imprisoned at the order of Tai Li, Chiang Kai-shek's trusted
subordinate and chief of the KMT's secret police.

On August

29, 1942, Ho was arrested apparently because the Kuomintang
had made its own plans to establish a Vietnamese nationalist
movement subject to its control.

The pretext for his arrest

was suspicion of espionage and invalid documents.37

He was

first confined at Chinghsi, 125 miles west of Nanning, the
capital of Kwangsi Province, but was moved often and later
recalled that he was confined
prisons.38

Ho

was

in

eighteen

different

finally released on September 10, 1943,

after agreeing, in return for his freedom, to mobilize the
Viet Minh organization to cooperate with the Chinese forces
under the control of an important Chinese warlord, General
36

Cooper, 11-12.

37

Chang Fa-K'uei, The Reminiscences of Chang Fa'Kuei (18961980) as to told to Julie Lieng-ying How (1926-1982) (Chinese
Oral History Project - East Asian Institute; New York: Columbia
University, 1970-1983, Microfiche), 683. [Henceforth, Chang]
38

Ibid., 684.
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Chang Fa-K'uei.
expulsion

of

Chang, who had

the

been

responsible

for

the

Chinese Communists from Canton in 1927,

was all the more vigilantly anti-Communist in 1943 because
of Chinese Communist battles against KMT forces raging
within the anti-Japanese war.

He

was, however, evidently

willing to overlook Ho's Communist background.

He planned

to use Ho's nationalist convictions for his own purposes and
those of the Kuomintang.39
Chang secured Ho's release without the knowledge of Tai
Li's or his minions.

Chang later recalled, however, that

when he informed Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters of Ho's
release, "the Center approved of my action. 1140
Ho for several specific reasons.
join

the

Viet

Nam

each

Menh

He released

First, he wanted Ho to

Dong

Minh

Hoi

(Vietnam

Revolutionary League) "to strengthen the League," Chang
later recalled.41

Secondly, Chang had just received word

from Chungking to prepare for an eventual Chinese invasion
of Vietnam.

Chang needed intelligence on the situation

across the border and was anxious to turn the nationalist
factions

inside

Vietnam

into

a

useful

political

� Ibid., 685-686.
Ibid., 686. Many writers have claimed that Ho wrote to
Chang from prison offering to reorganize the Viet Minh's
intelligence network in Tonkin for use by the Chinese in exchange
for his release. Chang recalled "He might have written me but I
do not recall hearing from him." Chang, 687.
40

41

Ibid., 685-686.
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organization. 42

In releasing Ho, Chang claimed his

principal motive had been to help a weak and oppressed
people to win independence.0
It was at this time that Ho, at Chang's suggestion,
changed his name from Nguyen Ai Quoc to his most famous
pseudonym, Ho Chi Minh, or "He Who Enlightens."

He had used

this name briefly in the early 1940s, but now used it to
hide his identity from Tai Li's agents and dispel the aura
of his past Communist activities.
Vietnamese nationalist
him

groups

Ho directed a number of

from

China.

Chang

paid

$100,000 Chinese a month for the espionage operations

in Indochina and Ho skillfully funneled most of those funds
to the Viet Minh.

But the intelligence that he provided

Chang was "trivial and on occasion, inaccurate."44
While

in

China,

Ho

adroitly

deferred

to

Chinese

authorities by pretending to work with them concerning
revolutionary plans for Vietnam after World War II.

If

anything, Ho was a master politician who "always avoided
open conflict with an enemy whose power he knew to be
greater than his own. 1145

A

skilled opportunist,

he was

not overly concerned with either appearances or what he had
42

Duiker, 78.

43

Chang, 687.

Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina
(New York: Octagon Books, 1974), 114; he quotes Pierre Celerier,
Menaces sur le Viet-Nam (Saigon, 1956), 21.
44

� Buttinger, 298-299.
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to do or say to avoid strife with potential adversaries.

He

told Chang Fa-K'uei that he was a communist Party member but
qualified himself by stating that his immediate objective
was

"Vietnamese freedom and independence.

He wanted

specially to guarantee that communism could not be carried
out in Vietnam for fifty years. 1146

Chang helped him because

Chang was bitterly opposed to colonialism and Ho was, in
Chang's eyes, "not a Chinese communist but a foreign
communist. . . . He was anti-imperialist, not against us."47
Ho probably adhered to some tenets of Communism, but he
never lost sight of his ultimate goal - Vietnamese
independence from French rule.
The opportunity to achieve that goal came with abrupt
suddenness on March 9, 1945, with the Japanese coup against
the French.

When Ho heard the news of the French fall, he

readied his return to Vietnam.

He expected that the Allies

were going to win in Europe, and that they would then focus
their military might on Japan.

Realizing that his time was

limited, he had to return to Tonkin as soon as possible "to
present a de facto, if not de juris (sic], authority in
Indochina to the conquering Allies if he were to gain and
retain control of an independent Viet Nam.""
Actually, the plan for a Viet Minh takeover had long
46

Chang, 688.

47

1 •
Ib'd

48

Patti, 52.

'

850 •
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been in readiness.

During the Eighth Conference of the ICP

in May 1941, at which the Viet Minh Front was created,
groundwork for an insurrection was laid.

The Viet Minh was

created to implement the resolution of national liberation.
By late 1942, because of effective grass-roots organizing,
"Viet Minh Committees" had begun to exercise effective power
on the local level through an underground administrative
organization that paralleled the French.�
On December 22, 1944, Vo Nguyen Giap created an armed
force in the Dinh Ca Valley and named it the "Armed
Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Vietnam."

That

date is now celebrated as the official birthday of the
"Vietnamese People's Army."
of a mere thirty-four men

The Brigade consisted at first
"chosen

from

section

leaders,

platoon commanders, or from outstanding members of local
armed groups. 1150

On Christmas eve 1944, the Brigade staged

its first attack against the two small French border posts
of Phai Khat and Na Ngan.

Both French garrisons were

massacred.51
After this episode, the Viet Minh began to expand its
activities.

Viet Minh cadres, following the slogan "Destroy

the granaries, solve the danger of hunger," led peasants in
49

Khanh, 774.

Vo Nguyen Giap, The Military Art of People's War,
translated by Russell Stetler (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1970), 68. (Henceforth, Giap)
50

51

Ibid.
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seizing hundreds of rural granaries and freely distributing
the rice. 52

Their assistance to the starving peasants paid

big dividends.

It enabled them to enlist more members and

gain broad popular support.

Word of these granary seizures

soon reached the cities and drastically changed the public
image of the Viet Minh.

No longer were they viewed as a

distant band of poorly equipped peasants."
Giap had over 10,000 men under arms.�

By mid-1945

They gave the

Vietnamese people hope that true independence for their
country was a possibility.
Thus, at the time of the Japanese coup against the
French, the Viet Minh was the best known, best organized and
strongest resistance group in Vietnam.
used it for intelligence operations.

The Chinese had even
This fact was

certainly known to the Americans, in particular to their
intelligence organization, the
Chinese connections.

oss,

which had extensive

Here was the beginning of the link

between the Americans and the Viet Minh.

52

Khanh, 776.

53

Ib'd
1 •

�

G1ap, 21.

,

776.

CHAPTER VI
THE ass AND HO CHI MINH
Prior

to

Pearl

Harbor,

the

United

states

had

no

coordinated intelligence gathering activities and no agency
that carried out secret operations.

While the Army and Navy

had i�telligence corps, they were, for the most part,
limited in

function.

Their

capability

to

collect

strategic intelligence or plan secret operations was
virtually nil.
Shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor, President
Roosevelt had asked William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, a 58
year old World War I Congressional Medal of Honor winner, to
draft plans for the creation of an intelligence service for
the United

states.

On

July

11,

1941,

the

Office

of

the Coordinator of Information (COI) came into existence,
and Roosevelt appointed "Wild Bill" its head.

On June 13,

1942, the CCI was renamed the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS).

Its purpose was to plan and carry out such special

services as collection of foreign intelligence, espionage,
sabotage, "black" or counterpropaganda, guerilla warfare and
other clandestine activities under the direction of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1
Donovan, as it turned out, did not operate by the book.
Instead, he stressed independent action and improvisation as
1

R. H. Smith, 1.
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the modus operandi of the

oss.

He gave his men great

freedom of maneuver and then supported them to the hilt.2
The OSS Chinese base was the result of a feud between
Donovan and General Douglas MacArthur, who had served
together in World War I.
between the two men

is

The origin of the bad blood
unknown,

but

MacArthur

may

have

been envious or jealous of the fact that Donovan had won
every major medal that a soldier can be awarded for combat.
When the COI was in its infancy in the fall of 1941,
MacArthur was outspoken in his opposition to an intelligence
service headed by Donovan.

A few months later, Donovan sent

Colonel Warren Clear, an intelligence officer and Japanese
specialist,

to

the

South

Pacific

to

explore

the

establishment of a COI espionage network in that theater of
operations.

For some reason Clear ran afoul of MacArthur

and gave Donovan's fledgling operation a bad name.3
To make up for Clear's failure, Donovan sent Professor
Joseph Hayden to make amends in December 1942.
a gaffe on Donovan's part.

But this was

Hayden had published a book,

entitled The Philippines, that was highly critical

of

MacArthur's prewar defense plan for the Philippines.

Hayden

Ibid., 5-6. According to Smith in Chapter 1 former
members of the oss read like a Who's Who of Twentieth Century
American History - Stewart Alsop, Lester Armour (of the meat
packing family), David Bruce, Ralph Bunche, Julia Child, C.
Douglas Dillon, Allen Dulles, Arthur Goldberg, Paul Mellon, Walt
Rostow, and Arthur Schlesinger Jr.
2

3

Ibid., 250.
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was therefore unwelcome, and besides that, he learned
MacArthur's intelligence aides had already established their
own intelligence network in the Pacific and wanted nothing
to do with Donovan's

oss.

MacArthur refused to discuss the

matter with Hayden who, not unexpectedly, returned to
Washi�gton empty handed.4
The

oss

did attempt to penetrate MacArthur's theater of

operations,

but

the

lone

operative

who

made

it

to

the Philippines was captured, not by the enemy, but by
MacArthur, and was sent home.
effectively banned the

oss

Pacific area of operations.

Thus, MacArthur had

from

working

in

his

South

Donovan's exclusion from it

forced him to establish a Chinese base for his Asian
operations.5
In April 1943 a joint secret service, known as the
Sino-American Cooperative Organization {SACO), was created
between the U.S. and the Kuomintang.

Donovan reluctantly

agreed to this relationship because it met with Roosevelt's
approval and Chiang
method

of

Kai-shek

had

Allied cooperation.

insisted

on

this

Under the directorship of

Tai Li, who was said to control over 300,000 agents in China
and every foreign nation where there were Chinese nationals,
SACO was to engage

in

espionage,

radio interception, and sabotage.
4

Ibid., 251.

5

Ibid., 250-251.

guerrilla

training,

The Chinese agreed to
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furnish the manpower and facilities while the U.S. provided
the weapons and supplies.6

SACO's headquarters was

established in Chungking, the Nationalist capital during the
war.

OSS relations with the Chinese were cool because no

one trusted Tai Li whose operation was like the Gestapo's.7
Later on the OSS moved its headquarters to Kunming, where
Chennault had his command.
American intelligence efforts in Indochina began with
the GBT or the "Gordon Group."

GBT was an acronym derived

from the last names of three men - Laurence Laing Gordon,
Harry V. Bernard, and Frank ("Frankie") Tan.8

To start

with, the leader of the group, Gordon, was a British subject
born in Canada who owned a coffee plantation in Kenya before
beginning a career in
beginning

of

the

Texaco in Haiphong.

international

war,

oil.

At

the

he directed operations for Cal

He moved to California shortly after

the Japanese occupation, but in early 1941 Cal-Texaco asked
him to return to Southeast Asia to look after its interests.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor took place, however,
before his departure and Cal-Texaco was forced to infiltrate
him into Vietnam.

Sir William Stephenson (later known as

"Intrepid"), who was the head of the British Security
Coordination

Office provided him with a cover.

6

Ibid., 245, 251-252.

7

Ibid., 248.

8

Patti, 44-45.

Stephenson
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was operating secretly out of New York City, with official
sanction from J. Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.

Gordon was recruited into the British Secret

Service and ordered to New Delhi.

There, on instructions

from the War Office in London, he was secretly commissioned
as a_captain in military intelligence.

He was assigned the

job of setting up an intelligence network in Indochina with
the help of the French military mission in Chungking.

The

Chinese authorized him to operate out of Lungching in
Kwangsi Province, which was adjacent to the Tonkin border
and had many access routes into Indochina.

Under the guise

of a free-lancing oil agent, Gordon traveled throughout
Cochinchina, Annam, and Tonkin.

Within a year Gordon was

joined by the other two men, both Americans.

Frank

(''Frankie") Tan was a Bostonian of Chinese extraction, and
Harry

v.

Bernard had worked for Cal-Texaco in Saigon but was

also a tobacco merchant for British firms.9
By 1943 they had managed to establish a radio network
and listening posts throughout Indochina.

Once they were in

full operation they began to make a substantial contribution
to Chinese

intelligence.

They were also indispensable to

Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force and various U.S. Navy
aviation units.

This network provided intelligence on

transporters, industry, shipping and airfields.

By the end

of 1944, the Fourteenth Air Force was providing most of the
9

Ibid.

74

group's operating funds as well as more modern and powerful
transmitters for its Vietnamese radio net.10

The Japanese

coup against the French on March 9, 1945, resulted in the
disruption of this group.

Further efforts by the United

States were necessary to obtain intelligence on Japanese
activities.
Meanwhile after the coup, the Allies realized that they
had to cultivate new avenues of clandestine communications
in Indochina if their plans against the Japanese in China
and the Pacific were
rely

on the

oss

to succeed.

supply

they had

to

office in China, which was quickly

authorized to use "any
Indochina.11

For this

and

all

resistance

groups" in

The Viet Minh was an organization that could

information

on

the

scale

desired.

Also, it had

shown its capability to rescue downed Allied pilots.
In late 1944 an American aircraft on a mission was shot
down

over

Cao

Bang

in

northern

Tonkin.

The

pilot,

a

Lieutenant Shaw, parachuted into the jungle and was rescued
by the Viet

Minh.

They took him to meet Ho on the Chinese

Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years
1941-1960 {Center of Military History, United States Army,
Washington, D. c.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 27.
[Henceforth, Spector]
10

11

Patti, 57 & 544; he quotes from OSS: Letter, Hqrs USFCT
[Headquarters us Forces, China Theater], dated 20 March 1945;
subject, "Intelligence Activities and Aid to Resistance Groups in
French Indo-China"; from Mervin E. Gross, B/Gen. [Brigadier
General], GSC [General Staff Corps], Act'g C/S [Acting Chief of
Staff], by command of M/Gen. [Major General] Chennault, to OSS-CT
[OSS-China Theater], APO 879.
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border.

Ho, seeing his opportunity, decided to escort Shaw

to Kunming.

At the border, the Chinese refused to allow him

to accompany Shaw, although Ho was eventually permitted
entry into China.

When he arrived in Kunming, Ho got in

oss.u

touch with the

Ho secretly went

In looking to the Americans for help,

to the office of Colonel Paul Helliwell, who was the Chief,
Secret Intelligence

branch, ass-Kunming

on four

occasions (late in 1944 and early in 1945).

separate

Ho offered to

give the OSS intelligence, to engage in sabotage against the
Japanese and to rescue downed Allied pilots in return for
arms and ammunition.

His proposals were rejected.

At that

time, the OSS had a policy of refusing aid to Communists
because they

were considered

postwar trouble.13

to be

Ho kept on trying.

a possible

source of

Finally, in early

March, upon Helliwell's orders, Ho received six new pistols
and twenty thousand rounds of ammunition just before he
departed for Tonkin.14

Helliwell later claimed that he had

King c. Chen, Vietnam and China: 1938-1954 {Princeton
(NJ]: Princeton University Press, 1969), 92-93. (Henceforth,
Chen]
12

" Shaplen, 33.
Some accounts say the pistols were either .38 caliber or
.45 caliber. For example, Helliwell, in a letter to Bernard Fall
dated October 14, 1954 (in The Two Vietnams, 100 & 457 n. 29),
stated "the only arms or ammunition which were ever given by
OSS/China to Ho were six .38 caliber revolvers." But Patti, who
had access to official documents, states "In early March
Helliwell authorized the issuance from OSS stock of six new Colt
.45 automatic pistols.
" Patti, 545 n. 19. Fenn, who recruited
Ho, refers to "six new Colt .45 automatic pistols in their
14
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given these arms to Ho as a token of appreciation for his
rescue of three downed American flyers.

He refused,

however, to send any more arms to the Viet Minh because Ho
refused to give assurances that he would not use them
against the French.15
On

March 17, 1945, Ho met with OSS agent Charles Fenn

at the Indochina Cafe on Chin-Pi Street in Kunming.

The two

worked out details by which Ho would set up intelligence
listening posts using ass-supplied radios.

Ho, who was

given the code name "Lucius," also agreed to rescue downed
American flyers, supply information on "Japanese troops in
Indochina, note trends in agriculture, and report on
typhoons, floods, and other disasters. 1116
It is worth noting that Ho was ultimately responsible
for the rescue of 17 American airmen. 17

On two occasions,

an airstrip located in the remote valley of Dien Bien Phu,
later to be the scene of the climactic battle against the

original wrappings" and further states "As AGAS had none in stock
we got these from oss. I rather think this is how it came about
that an OSS officer later reported supplying Ho with 'six .38
revolvers' at one of his 'several meetings in South China.'"
Fenn, 79 & n. 9.
15

Shaplen, 33.

16

Chen, 93.

Lloyd Shearer. "When Ho Chi Minh Was an Intelligence Agent
for the U.S." Parade Magazine, 18 March 1973, 8. [Henceforth,
Shearer].
·

17

77
French in 1954, was used to smuggle out Allied flyers.18
During one of his meetings with Fenn, Ho asked to be
introduced to General Chennault, the commander of U.S. Army
Air Forces in China who had created the American Volunteer
Group {AVG), best known as the Flying Tigers, to combat
Japan�se air forces in China.
introduction but only if

Fenn agreed to arrange an

Ho agreed

not

to

ask

him

anything - neither supplies nor promises of support.�
March 29,
rescuing

Ho
a

met Chennault.

downed

The General

thanked

for
On

Ho

for

American pilot {probably Shaw) in

Indochina and they discussed saving more pilots.

As Ho was

about to leave, he said
he had a small favor to ask the general. • • • But all
Ho wanted was the general's photograph • • . • In due
course . . • a folder of eight-by-ten glossies (were
produced]. "Take your pick," says Chennault. Ho takes
one and asks would the general be so kind as to sign
it? . • • . Chennault writes across the bottom, "Yours
Sincerely, Claire L. Chennault."m
Ho later used this photograph to convince skeptical
Vietnamese nationalists that he was backed by the United
States.
On April 27, 1945, Ho met Major Archimedes Patti, an

oss

operative, at the village of Chiu Chou Chieh, about 6

miles outside of Chinghsi.

Patti would later be the

Bernard B. Fall, Hell In A Very Small Place: The Siege Of
Dien Bien Phu {New York: Da Capo, 1986), 23.
18

19

Fenn, 77.

20

Ibid., 78-79.
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oss contingent that flew to Hanoi after

commander of the

Japan's surrender.

Patti was the son of an Italian-American

attorney in New York who was a political associate of
General Donovan.

In their first conversation Ho described

to Patti how difficult life in Tonkin had
of

the

widespread

famine.

become because

Ho's sincerity impressed

Patti, who felt that "he could be trusted as an ally against
the Japanese. 1121
American

aid

At
in

this

the

meeting

form

of

Ho argued

that

communication equipment,

weapons, and American instructors to train the Viet Minh
would be of great help to his resistance movement.

He did

not, however, directly ask for such aid or commitment from
the Allies.
and,

He merely suggested that it would be helpful

in return, his military-political organization would

be of great assistance to the Allies.n
Shortly after his meeting with Patti, Ho returned to
Vietnam.

He set up his military and political headquarters

at Tan Trao, about 75 miles north of Hanoi.

He moved

quickly to consolidate Viet Minh authority by taking over
six northern provinces and parts of three more in Tonkin.
The six were Cao Bang, Bae Can, Lang Son, Ha Giang, Tuyen
Quang, and

Thai Nguyen.23

Interestingly, approximately 85 percent of this area's
21

Patti, 86.

22

Ibid., 87.

n Ibid., 550 n. 2.
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population were non-Vietnamese minorities who had never been
fully pacified by the French. 24
Viet

Minh and

guerilla
find

provided food

movement.

Thus,

They actively supported the
and shelter

the

Viet

Minh

for the
were

able

to
In

ready recruits among the mountainous tribesmen. 25

fact, in 1941 Giap had formed an alliance with Chu Van Tan,
the tribal leader of the Tho.

This montagnard tribe was one

of the largest of the minority groups and inhabited a
physically impregnable area that would serve as Giap's
stronghold. 26
After establishing his base of operations, Ho began to
send intelligence information to the Americans in Kunming.
Most of these reports dealt with the location and strength
of

various

construction

Japanese
and

units

and

improvements

outlined
to

former

Japanese
French

fortifications.v
In the five months after the March 9 coup to the August
Revolution, there was a flurry of Viet Minh activity.

Ho

ordered it to expand its guerrilla warfare activities in
preparation for a general insurrection.

Soon after the

coup, they were able to recruit several thousand formerly
French-employed Vietnamese militia.
24

Marr, 147; Vu, 410.

25

Dunn, 13.

26

Ibid.

27

Patti, 102.

The Viet Minh also
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picked up weapons, including machine guns and mortars, from
the fleeing French.

Within a week of the coup, guerilla

units

small

were

making

scale

attacks

on

Japanese

outposts.28
The

"Viet

Minh

Committees"

from

the 1942 period

were.�upplanted by "People's Revolutionary Committees."
Wherever possible
over

(mostly

local governments.

in

over one million people.
for military,

areas),

they

took

The largest area that they

administered was the "Liberated
six provinces in northern

rural
Zone"

Tonkin.
They

consisting of the

In all they governed

set up

training schools

political, and administrative affairs in this

zone and sent their newly trained cadres to all areas of
Vietnam.29

The collapse of the French along with Japanese

pre-occupation with the Pacific war created a vacuum of
power in the many areas of Vietnam isolated from
administrative and military control centers.30

The

"Revolutionary Committees" quickly filled this vacuum.
These committees also seized Japanese and French-owned
properties and distributed them to the poor.

Taxes were

abolished, working hours were shortened, and other reforms
were put into effect.31
28

Khanh, 775.

29

Ibid., 776.

30

Ibid.,

31

Ibid.

781.
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Patti encountered difficulties with French authorities
while he was in China and when he transferred to Hanoi.

The

French wanted to reoccupy their former colony at the
earliest possible moment.

Because they suspected the

Americans of being sympathetic to Ho Chi Minh and his
followers, they attempted to subvert any American effort
that ran counter to their plans.

Helliwell later said:

It was perfectly obvious by June of 1945 that the
French were infinitely more concerned with keeping the
Americans out of Indochina than they were in defeating
the Japanese or in doing anything to bring the war to a
successful conclusion in that area.n
A note from the French Embassy in China to the American
Embassy in China, dated January 20, 1945, sums up France's
postwar plans for Indochina.
First, France cannot admit any discussion about
the principal of her establishment in Indochina • . . •
The occupation of Indochina by the Japanese has not
changed anything in that state of affairs. This
occupation is nothing but a war incident similar to
the invasion by the Japanese forces of Malaya, of the
Netherlands East Indies and Burma • • • • France intends
to take part in the liberation of those of her
territories that have been momentarily torn away from
her by the enemy. 33
Even de Gaulle was fully aware that "new nationalist
movements were springing up all over the world, with Russia
and America competing for their adherence. 1134

There can be

little doubt that France was going to do everything in its
32

Shaplen, 41.

33

FRUS

34

de Gaulle - Salvation, 253.

-

British, 295.
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power to reestablish her authority in Indochina as soon as
possible, and it was not going to let the Americans, or Ho's
independence movement, stand in her way.
Meanwhile, Roosevelt had opposed all plans that
involved the
Indochina.

use

of

French

troops

to

liberate

He even refused to approve "low level

intelligence and commando-type operations in Indochina
involving French participation. 1135

In the meantime, the

U.S. was making plans to reestablish its intelligence
network inside of Vietnam.

These plans would involve direct

military aid to Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh.

35

Spector, 2 4 .

CHAPTER VII
THE DEER TEAM
In mid-May 1945, a United States Army lieutenant named
Phelan,
Bank,

a

former

official

of

the

Chase

Manhattan

parachuted into Ho's jungle headquarters near the

villa9e of Kim Lung in northern Tonkin.

His mission was to

establish an underground that would help downed Allied
flyers escape to freedom.1

Phelan was to act as a liaison

between the Viet Minh and the
team to Ho's base.

oss until the OSS could send a

He lived and worked with Ho for several

months and found him most helpful toward the Allied cause.
During that time Ho sent out scouting and raiding parties in
addition to rescuing
that

Ho

Allied

soldiers.

Phelan

recalled

was interested in other things:

He kept asking me if I could remember the language
of our Declaration [of Independence]. I was a normal
American, I couldn't. I could have wired up to Kunming
and had a copy dropped to me, of course, but all he
really wanted was the flavor of the thing. The more we
discussed it, the more he actually seemed to know about
it than I did. As a matter of fact, he knew more about
almost everything than I did. . • .2
Unwittingly,

Phelan

had

helped

Ho

write part of

1

Shaplen, 28; he refers to Phelan as "John." Fenn confirms
that "John" was indeed Phelan; Fenn, 81-82. Patti says that a
young lieutenant named Phelan, from AGAS (Air Ground Aid Section
China), was assigned to undertake a mission as a liaison officer
between Ho and the oss; Patti, 126.
Ibid., p. 29; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.
The United States and Vietnam: 1944-1947. A staff study based on
the Pentagon Papers, study no. 2. 92d Cong., 2d sess.,
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), 2.
2
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Vietnam's Declaration of Independence.
During the first week of June Ho informed the OSS that
he was prepared to make available up to one thousand well
trained guerrillas for any plans that the Americans might
have for use against the Japanese.

In response, the

oss

launched a plan to train two intelligence teams, code-named
"Cat" and "Deer," that were to be infiltrated into northern
Tonkin.

Captain (later Major) Charles M. Holland and Major

Allison K. Thomas were chosen to head the two teams.3
In the late afternoon of July 16, a team commanded by
Major Thomas parachuted into the vicinity of Kim Lung.

The

Americans under Thomas were Sergeant William Zeilski, a
radio operator, and Private First Class Henry A. Prunier, a
French and Annamese interpreter.
contingent

consisting

of

a

The team included a French

Lieutenant

Montfort and

two

Vietnamese sergeants in the French army, Logos and Phac.4
The French officer was included in the team because of
French pressure.
with

On May 30, the French forces in China,

oss approval, had launched a major intelligence

gathering operation coded named "PAKHOI" (after the South
China seaport
3

of that name which is now called Peihai). 5

Patti, 107 & 125.

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Causes,
Origins and Lessons of the Vietnam War. Hearings, 92d Congress.,
2d sess., (Washington, D. c.: GPO, 1972), 251. (Henceforth,
Causes]
4

5

Patti, 106-107.
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It involved two patrol boats supported by motor-junks, all
manned by French crews.

Operating in the northern area of

the Gulf of Tonkin, mostly outside of Haiphong, they watched
the coast and "began to transmit (with

oss radios) valuable

Japanese shipping information and assisted our [U.S.] naval
coas:tal team in taking soundings. • . • 116

The OSS had also

agreed with General Sabattier to train some French and
Vietnamese troops in Chinghsi, China for use with
intelligence operations such as the Cat and Deer Teams.
When the French troop commander, a Major Courthlac, arrived
at the Chinese training area, he "demanded that

oss pay his

troops and also provide funds for their rations."7
not part of the OSS agreement with Sabattier.

This was

Major Thomas,

who was in charge of the training, had no funds for such a
demand and refused Courthlac's demands.

The French then

stopped transmitting PAKHOI intelligence information.
induce

the

French

intelligence, the
accompany

any

to

To

resume their transmission of

oss had to agree that Frenchmen would

oss team parachuted into Tonkin. Thus,

Montfort went with the Deer Team.

The French also agreed to

pay for the troop training at Chinghsi.8
Upon landing Thomas later reported that
We were first greeted by
6

Ibid.

7

Ibid., 107.

8

Ibid.

[NAME DELETED]

of AGAS and
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by [NAME DELETED] the boy from Boston, and employed
by GBT • • • • I was then escorted to Mr. Hoe [sic], one
of the big leaders of the VML (Viet Minh League) Party.
He speaks excellent English but is very weak
physically.9
Thomas also noted that the Viet Minh had hoisted signs in
English welcoming the group to Ho's headquarters.

Although

the Deer team tried to disguise Lieutenant Montfort's
identity as a Frenchman, because they feared that the
Vietnamese might harm him, he was immediately recognized by
one of the Viet Minh who had served under him in the French
colonial army at Cao Bang in northern Tonkin.

Ho told

Thomas that "it would be impossible for Lt. Montfort, the
French officer, to stay, nor would any more French be
welcome. 1110

Several days later one of the French army

sergeants, Phac, was identified by a Viet Minh as a member
of the pro-Chinese Nationalist Party (VNQDD). The Viet Minh
detained him.

On July 30 Montfort and the two Vietnamese

sergeants were escorted to a nearby village to join twenty
other French refugees.
to China.

This

Montfort led them all on foot back

incident

did

not

alter

the friendly

Causes, 244. Quote from Copy of OSS Report. After Action
Report no. 1, dated 17 July 1945 (Kim Lung, Tonkin); received at
Kunming 27 July 1945; from "Deer" to "Chow." Patti says that
Lieutenant Phelan parachuted into Tonkin where he was met by
Frankie Tan of the GBT Group; Patti, 126. Tan, as noted earlier,
came from Boston and is the person referred to in the second
deletion. Phelan is most likely the person referred to in the
first deletion.
9

Ibid., 257. Quote from oss Report on the Deer Mission,
dated 17 September 1945, part VI, "Life in FIC [French Indochina]
from arrival of Advance Party to arrival of remainder of team."
Entry of 17 July.
10
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relationship between the Americans and the Viet Minh.11
According to Henry Prunier, when the Deer team first
arrived, "Ho was dying of dysentery and malaria.

We did

what we could to keep him alive that first week. 1112
radioed the

oss

Thomas

and asked for a medic to be included with

the final contingent of the Deer team that was to be dropped
into Ho's headquarters a few days later.
group arrived.
and

Lieutenant

On July 29 the

It was led by Captain Charles M. Holland
Rene

Defourneaux.

It

included

Staff

Sergeant Lawrence Vogt, a weapons instructor, Sergeant Aaron
Squires, a field photographer, and Private First Class Paul
Hoagland, the medic.

Lieutenant Defourneaux was born and

grew up in France before moving to New York.
U.S. Army intelligence officer since 1943.13

He had been a
Hoagland, who

had received his training aboard a Swedish prisoner-exchange
ship in the early days of the war, immediately began to
treat Ho because his diagnosis was that "such a fever had to
be caused by either malaria, dengue or dysentery, or a
combination of all three - plus God only knows what other
mysterious Oriental diseases."w
11

He administered quinine,

Patti, 128.

Henry A. Prunier, "City Man Helped Train Guerrillas of Ho
Chi Minh." Interview by Raymond P. Girard. (Worcester [MAJ The
Evening Gazette, 14-15 May 1968) (Henceforth, Prunier interview.]
12

Causes, 251; Rene Defourneaux, "Secret Encounter with Ho
Chi Minh." [As told to James Flowers] (Look, 9 August 1966), 3233. (Henceforth, Defourneaux]
13

M

Defourneaux, 32.
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sulfa drugs and other medicines to the ailing Vietnamese
leader.

The treatment was effective.

within ten days.

Ho was on his feet

He had many conversations with Defourneaux

over the next three months.

Ho revealed that he had spent

time in New York City and Boston.

He told Prunier that he

had worked as a waiter in Boston.

Prunier recalled that Ho

thought that the United States would help him in
throwing out the French and in establishing an
independent country • . . • He was convinced that
America was for free, popular governments all over the
world; that it opposed colonialism in all its
forms • • . • he seemed sincere in his desire to have
our help. . . • He knew American history well, and he
would talk about American ideals and how he was sure
America would be on his side • 15
In

speaking

about

America's

colonial

record,

Ho

told

Defourneaux,
I have always been impressed with your country's
treatment of the Philippines. You kicked the Spanish
out and let the Filipinos develop their own country.
You were not looking for real estate, and I admire you
for that. 16
In a later conversation with Defourneaux, Ho pleaded for
American assistance stating:
Will the United States intercede for me when the French
return to Vietnam? . . • • your diplomats speak of
helping people with self-determination. Am I any
different from Nehru, Quezon - even your George
Washington? Was not Washington considered a
revolutionary? I, too, want to set my people free.17
During

the

next

u Prunier interview.
M

Defourneaux, 33.

17

Ibid., 33.

four

weeks

Thomas

and

his
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American specialists spent their time training about two
hundred future leaders of the Viet Minh in the use of the
Vo Nguyen

latest American weapons and guerilla tactics.
Giap, who had become the Viet

Minh's master military

strategist and tactician, personally handpicked this elite
group of soldiers for the specialized training. 18
Americans supplied the Viet Minh with carbines,
tommyguns, bazookas, mortars, and grenades.

The
M-l's,

They taught

them how to blow up bridges and disassemble railroad
tracks . 19

Patti remarked "Some of us may have suspected

that in the future the weapons and training might be used
against the French, but no one dreamed that they would ever
be used against Americans. 1120

According to Prunier,

it wasn't very long before we had our men firing
mortars like experts. They had an uncanny ability to
learn and adapt. They learned to pull a rifle apart
and put it together again after being shown only a
couple of times. 21
While the Americans were training the Viet Minh, Ho
tried to keep his options open for a reconciliation with the
French.

On July 18, Thomas radioed the OSS and requested

that they relay a message to the French in Kunming that Ho
was willing to meet with a high ranking French official to

18

Patti, 129.

19

Prunier interview.

20

Patti, 129.

21

Prunier interview.
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see what the French might be willing to offer.22

Ho

particularly wanted to talk to a senior official about de
Gaulle's December 8, 1943, Algiers speech in which the
General said:
To these people who have affirmed their national
feeling and sense of political responsibility, France
intends to give a new political order within the French
community; in the framework of the Indochinese federal
organization, the freedoms of the different countries
will be extended and consecrated.n
Ho also wanted clarification of a broad non-committal
declaration that the Ministry of Colonies had issued on
March 24,

1945,

concerning

the

future

of

Indochina.

This declaration, which had been published on March 25,
1945, in the Journal Officiel de la Republique Franqaise,

Ordonnances et Decret, stated that, after the war, the
five countries which make up the Indochinese federation
(Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Laos) would
be returned to France and form with France and the
other members of the commonwealth a "Franunion. 1124
This

declaration

did

not

mention

independence

but

did

enumerate some reforms and promised Vietnam a special place
in the organization of the French Union.

On this occasion,

however, the French failed to respond to Ho's request for a
meeting. 25
On July 25, Ho again expressed a desire to talk with
22

Patti, 128.

23

Buttinger, 302.

24

Patti, 550 n. 9.

25

Ibid., 129.
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the French.

He was allowed to radio a request to the French

government which outlined a five-point program of reforms.
The terms that Ho proposed were as follows:
We the V.M.L. request the following points be made
public by the French and incorporated into the future
policy of French Indo-China.
1.
That there be universal suffrage to elect a
parliament for the governing of the country, that there
be a French Governor-General as President until such
time as independence be granted us, that he chose a
cabinet or group of advisors acceptable to that
parliament. Exact powers of all these officers may be
discussed in the future.
2.
That independence be given this country in not
less than five years and not more than ten.
3.
That natural resources of the country be returned
to the people of the country by just payment to the
present owners, and that France be granted economic
concessions.
4.
That all freedoms outlined by the United Nations
will be granted to the Indochinese.
That the sale of opium be prohibited.
5.
We hope that these conditions may be acceptable to
the French government.26
Unfortunately, both of these messages went unanswered and
unacknowledged.

The intransigence of the French was to cost

them dearly in the future.

Undoubtedly, Ho was trying to

keep all of his options open to ensure the future
independence of Vietnam.

The French, however, were not

interested in these proposals, and "No one in Kunming had
the authority to accept these or any other terms. 1127
Not having heard from the French, Ho felt he had no
choice but to forge ahead with his plans for an independent
Vietnam.

His chance came when the Japanese surrendered on

26

Ibid., 129.

27

Hammer, 12 9 .
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August 15.

The outcome was the August Revolution.

CHAPTER VIII
THE AUGUST REVOLUTION
Ho was hardly ready for the sudden end of the war.

It

came in the wake of the dropping of atom bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki at the beginning of August 1945.

Nevertheless,

he moved quickly to consolidate power in Hanoi, Hue, and
Saigon.

He realized that he had to show the Allies that

his independence movement was both legitimate and strong.
Thus, his main aim from August 6, the day the first bomb was
dropped on Hiroshima, was the immediate seizure of power by
the Viet Minh.

To that end he sent out a call for a

conference of Viet Minh party delegates and political
leaders.

By August 13, the day that news of Japan's offer

to surrender reached Vietnam, most of the delegates had
arrived at Tan Trao.

That evening a National Insurrection

Committee headed by Giap came into being.

It issued

Military Order Number 1 which proclaimed the surrender of
the Japanese Fascists and mandated a general

insurrection

and called "on Viet Minh troops and cadres to seize power
before the arrival of Allied troops."1
The first People's National Congress convened on August
16, the day after the surrender.
delegates

who

organization in
1

It consisted of over sixty

represented

almost

Indochina

including

Vu, 418; Dunn, 16.
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every

political

members

of

minority

94

races.

It approved the resolution for the general

insurrection.

In the next two days

it adopted a ten-point program, a national flag • • • a
national anthem, and elected the Viet Nam Committee for
National Liberation, headed by Ho Chi Minh as
President, to act as the provisional government pending
national elections.2
Ho convinced the congress to adopt a policy that called for
the Viet Minh to seize control from the Japanese and Kim's
puppet government before the arrival of Allied troops.3

He

also persuaded it to welcome Allied forces that were coming
to disarm the Japanese
Chennault's

troops.

Ho

showed

off

General

autographed photo and claimed he had American

backing for his

cause.

He also distributed the six pistols

that Helliwell had given him to various Viet Minh leaders.
To them, these pistols seemed to indicate Ho had U.S.
support.
Meanwhile,

the

local

"People's

Revolutionary

Committees," which were located in the villages and counties
of almost every province in North and Central Vietnam, took
over the political and administrative networks and started
to exercise power.4

The transfer of power was accomplished

with ease.

It was rapid, and peaceful with virtually no

bloodshed.

In many places, the local leaders were so eager

2

Patti, 135.

Ibid., 135; he quotes from Nguyen Khac Vien, The Long
Resistance (1858-1975) (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1975), 100.
3

4

Khanh, 761.
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to assume power that they acted without instructions from
the ICP.

Rural areas were taken over first, and then the
The Viet Minh audaciously

Viet Minh moved into the cities.
presented itself as the united
and

patriots,

and

front

of

all

nationalists

it fearlessly declared that it was the

Vietnamese arm of the victorious Allied forces. 5
Within ten days, the Viet Minh had jurisdiction over
most of Vietnam.
commemorated as
Revolution."

Hanoi was secured on August 19, now
the

day

of

the

"Success

The Kim government collapsed.

of

the

In Hanoi the

Japanese permitted the Viet Minh to occupy all important
public buildings with the exception of the Bank of
Indochina, which the Japanese Army still guarded.

Hue, the

old imperial capital, was taken over on August 23, and Bao
Dai was asked to resign.

On August 25 he gave up his

throne, assumed the name of Citizen Vinh Thuy, and
his

support

of

the

Viet

Minh

was a godsend for the Viet Minh.

regime.

pledged

His abdication

In turning over the

imperial seal and the lineaments of his office, Bao Dai
effectively demonstrated to the tradition-minded Vietnamese
that an important historical shift of power had taken place,
and that the new Democratic Republic of Viet Nam had the
mandate of heaven. 6
5

Saigon was occupied on August 25.

Buttinger, 296.

Sacks, 153; he quotes from Tran Huy Lieu, "The Emperor's
Golden sword," in Factual Records of the Vietnam August
Revolution, by the Viet Nam Cultural Association for National
6

96
Never before in its history had Vietnam seemed so united.
The Japanese were the only force that could prevent the Viet
Minh

Their

from taking power, and they remained neutral.

inaction made the victory of the Viet Minh possible. 7
On August 16 the Deer team, which had finished training
the Viet Minh, left with a unit under the command of Giap.
The delegates to the party Congress, which had convened that
same day, were further impressed by Ho's "apparent" American
In this deceptive manner Ho's forces

military assistance.

were able to present "themselves as the Vietnamese arm of
the victorious

Allies. 118

The

Deer

team

accompanied

Giap's troops all the way to Hanoi located about 75 miles
south of Tan Trac.

Some forty miles from Hanoi, General

Giap and his troops, along with Thomas and his Deer team,
engaged in a battle with the Japanese at Thai Nguyen.

They

were still clashing with the Japanese on August 23, a week
after Japan surrendered, because the Japanese troops in the
field had not received word that the war was over. 9

In

fact, the Japanese did not surrender Thai Nguyen to the Viet
Minh until August 28.
In July 1945 the United States, Great Britain, and the
Liberation {Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, no date),
25-32.
7

Buttinger, 298.

8

R. H. Smith, 335; Buttinger 312.

9

Patti, 167; Boettcher, 72-73.
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Soviet Union had met at Potsdam.

They agreed that Indochina

would be divided at the 16th parallel to facilitate the
Japanese surrender.

The Chinese army was to occupy the area

north of the parallel and the British the southern area.
France was not in a position to object to this plan because
of her weak status with the Allies.

Nevertheless de Gaulle

opposed the Potsdam agreement.

He wanted French troops to

liberate the

He believed that China

French colonies.

sympathized with the Viet Minh and had no wish to permit
restoration of French control in Indochina. 10
with Truman, he said France

In speaking

was "not eager to see British

troops replace the Japanese in the southern part of
Indochina or Chinese troops in the
knew

that

"our

re-established. 1112

direct

north."11

administration

But

could

he

not

also
be

As it turned out, however, the British

reoccupation of Cochinchina insured France's return to the
south.

Britain was also a colonial power and was

sympathetic to France's desire to retain her colony.
Although Ho had known Stalin in the early 1920s, the
Soviet Union was not interested in Indochina's fate after
the war and did nothing to aid Ho or the Viet Minh.
According to McLane, no reliable evidence has come to light
showing Soviet involvement "in any way in the wartime
10

Sullivan, 40.

11

de Gaulle - Salvation, 243.

12

Ib.1. d .

,

261.
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strategies of the Vietminh or in Communist tactics during
the August uprising. n 13
In fact, United states intelligence agencies at the
time could find no evidence linking Ho to Soviet Communism.
In July 1948, a report of the Intelligence and Research
Division of the United States state Department stated that
the
Dept has no evidence of direct link between Ho and
Moscow but assumes it exists, nor is it able evaluate
amount pressure or guidance Moscow exerting. We have
impression Ho must be given or is retaining large
degree of latitude.M
In the fall of 1948 the same state Department office
conducted a survey of Communist influence in Southeast Asia.
Confirmation of Kremlin-directed conspiracies was found in
virtually

all

countries

except

evaluation was most telling.

Vietnam.

The

report's

It stated

If there is a Moscow-directed conspiracy in Southeast
Asia, Indochina is an anomoly [sic] so far.
Possible explanations are:
1. No rigid directives have been issued by
Moscow.
2. The Vietnam government considers that it has
no rightist elements that must be purged.
3. The Vietnam Communists are not subservient to
the foreign policies pursued by Moscow.
4. A special dispensation for the Vietnam
government has been arranged in Moscow.
Of these possibilities, the first and fourth seem most
likely.is
When the war ended, the Soviets were more interested in
0

McLane, 266-267.

14

U.S. - Vietnam Relations, Book I, Part I.A, A-5.
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Ibid., A-6.
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their own internal affairs and in Eastern Europe.
Soviet Union needed
and

time

for

political stabilization.

economic

The

reconstruction

From a strategic standpoint,

Stalin feared a revitalized Germany, which motivated him to
build a buffer zone along the Soviet Union's East European
border.

He also wanted to cultivate alliances with western

European nations.16

His main aims in the Far East were to

recover territories lost to Japan during the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-1905, and

to

obtain

Japanese.

he

supported a coalition government

In

China;

reparations

of the Kuomintang and the Communists.
more interested

in

in Manchuria than in

He

from

appeared

the
to

be

dismantling Japanese industrial plants
helping fellow Communists like Mao

Tse-Tung, the leader of the

Chinese Communist Party. 17

Concerning the rest of Asia, Stalin

was non-committal,

although he did support Roosevelt's postwar

plan

that

Indochina be governed by an international trusteeship.18

By

and large, the Soviets did not want to take a stand on the
colonial question after the war because they were too busy
binding up the wounds inflicted upon them by the Germans.
Also, Stalin was assiduously courting de Gaulle and did not
want to antagonize him over the Indochina issue.

Thus, with

a foothold in Cochinchina under British auspices, and Stalin
16

Vu, 507.

IT

Ibid., 508 & 511.

18

FRUS

-

Cairo and Teheran,

4 8 5.
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courting de Gaulle, France was assured a good chance of
recovering her colony.

CHAPTER IX
THE OSS TEAM IN HANOI
As the war came to an end in August 1945, Allied
authorities were concerned about the fate of POW's in
They feared that the

Japanese hands when the war ended.

defeated Japanese might cut off provisions and take
reprisals. The

oss was directed to prepare plans for a

rescue operation.

By late January 1945, it had organized

commando units known as Mercy Teams that would parachute
into POW camps after the surrender to "provide for the
prisoners' safety, prevent any maltreatment,
nearby

airfields

for

quick

and

clear

air evacuation." 1

Patti was in charge of the Mercy Team that landed in
Hanoi on August 22.

He and his team were accompanied by

Jean Sainteny, chief of M.5, the French intelligence unit in
Kunming (a division of SLFEO), and four other Frenchmen.
Sainteny had been a Hanoi banker, a French resistance
leader, and was the son-in-law of Albert Sarraut, a former
Governor General of Indochina.

After landing at Gia Lam

Airport, Patti's group was escorted into Hanoi by the
Japanese.

Along the way Patti noticed hundreds of Viet Minh

flags and huge banners with English slogans that hung from
the trees.

The

and proclaimed
1

banners

denounced

"Independence

or

Patti, 141.
101

French

Death,"

imperialism
"Vietminh

for

102
the Vietnamese," "Down with French Imperialism," and
11

2,000,000 people died under French domination. 112
Patti set up his headquarters in the Hotel Metropole.

As soon as the local Vietnamese learned about the presence
of the Frenchmen, an unruly and hostile crowd surrounded the
hotel_,

The Japanese commander suggested to Patti that it

might be best for the Frenchmen to be housed in the Governor
General's Palace where the Japanese could protect them.
This was acceptable to Sainteny, who did not realize that,
once ensconced in his new quarters, he would become a
virtual prisoner of the Japanese.
leave the Palace grounds.

They refused to let him

Later on Sainteny would claim

that this was an "American plot" to prevent reestablishment
of French control over Indochina.

On September 1, the

Japanese sentries at the Governor's Palace were replaced by
Viet Minh guards.

Sainteny and his men then became virtual

captives. 3
As Patti settled in at the Hotel Metropole, Ho "and his
guerrillas, accompanied by Major Thomas's OSS group, were
making their triumphant march to Hanoi. "4

After Thomas and

his men made contact with Patti, they made plans to return
to China.

Before Thomas and his men left, "Ho gave them a

warm send-off.

'I want to thank each of you for what you

2

R. H. Smith, 349; Causes, 264.

3

Patti, 157-158.

4

R. H. Smith, 349.
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have done for us,' he said.

'We are truly grateful.' 115

On August 23 Patti met with General Tsuchihashi to
discuss the Allied POW's.

Tsuchihashi said that he would

have to consult with Tokyo before allowing Patti to have
access to them.

first_ visited the
thousand

Patti

This took about forty-eight hours.
Citadel,

which

French prisoners.

housed

around

four

Leaving the Citadel, he then

visited the POW camp located at Gia Lam airport, where all
the Indian and British POW's

were

kept.

Patti found that

most of the POW's were in good shape both mentally and
physically.

The condition of POW's in Indochina was better

than that of others in the Pacific theatre because the
French people smuggled medicines, food, and other supplies
into the POW camps. 6
was

surprised

to

Returning to the
learn

that

Metropole,

Patti

an unidentified Frenchman

had stopped by the hotel and left a note indicating that
there was an American prisoner at the citadel.

They

subsequently learned that this American, a flight crewman
downed in 1943, was posing as a Hungarian citizen in the
French Foreign Legion to escape Japanese detection.

Patti

obtained his release on August 28 and the man was flown home
several days later.7
On August 26 Patti met with both Ho Chi Minh and Vo
5

Ibid., 350.

6

Dunn, 132.

7

Patti, 177-178.
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Nguyen Giap in Ho's Hanoi headquarters.

Ho brought Patti up
He was

to date on what was occurring in Hanoi and Saigon.
clearly

worried

about

Sainteny's

presence

in

Hanoi

and believed it boded ill for his newly established
Provisional government.

He was also concerned about the

impending arrival of Chinese
strain

on the

troops, who

would put

meager resources of the country.

a

Patti

assured Ho that he would forward his concerns to OSS
headquarters in Kunming.8
Sainteny asked Patti to set up a meeting with Ho.

Ho

agreed as long as Patti would be present, but he also
decided to send Giap in his place.
August 27 and
wrong foot.

Sainteny

The meeting was held on

immediately

got

off

on

the

He complained to Giap about the Viet Minh's

recent stand that France was no longer welcome in Indochina.
Giap stood up to him and told Sainteny that he did not come
to the meeting to be lectured, but that he was willing to
exchange views with the French representative.

Sainteny

stated that France would grant most of the Vietnamese
requests.

When Giap pressed Sainteny

proposals,
generalities

however,
and

Sainteny

vague

for

specific

only replied

promises.

with

more

The meeting ended with

both sides realizing that their differences could not be
solved amicably.9
8

Ibid., 201-202.

9

Ibid., 208-209.
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Patti met with Ho again on August 29.

At that meeting

Ho informed Patti that he would proclaim September 2 as
Independence

Day.

Ho told Patti that the draft of their

independence declaration needed some polishing and asked him
for assistance.

Patti was astounded by the opening words,

which_were copied directly from the American Declaration of
Independence.

He then helped Ho polish the draft, as

several words from the American Declaration had been
transposed. 10
On Independence Day (September 2, the same day that
Japan

signed the formal surrender papers aboard the

u.s.s.

Missouri) Patti and his men made their way to Ba Dinh Square
where the official ceremonies were to take place.

Ho had

invited Patti to sit on the official platform with other
dignitaries, but Patti declined to do so as he wanted to mix
with the crowds and be an observer.
stepped up to the microphone.

Ho was introduced and

The crowd cheered for several

minutes before Ho raised his hands and called for silence.u
He began his now-famous proclamation for Vietnamese
independence with the following words:
All men are created equal. The Creator has given us
certain inviolable Rights; the right to Life, the right
to be Free, and the right to achieve Happiness.12
10

Ibid., 223.

11

Ibid., 249.

Ibid., 250; he notes that this is a literal translation
and that it may be at variance with that of most historians who
were not present to hear Ho's delivery, but it is the agreed
12
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Ho then paused and asked his listeners: "Do you hear me
distinctly, fellow countrymen?"
"Yes!"

The crowd roared back:

Ho continued:

These immortal words are taken from the Declaration of
Independence of the United States of America in 1776.
In a larger sense, this means that: All the people on
earth are born equal; All the people have the right to
live, to be happy, to be free.0
Ho then shifted to the Declaration of the French Revolution
made in 1791 on the "Rights of Man and the Citizen" and told
his audience that it "also states: 'All men are born free
and with equal
and

rights,

have equal rights.

and

must

always

remain

free

Those are undeniable truths.'" 14

Ho continued his speech with a castigation of French
colonialism based on the grievances stated in the American
Declaration

of

Independence

against

colonial

rule.

He

proceeded:
Nevertheless, for more than eighty years, the French
imperialists, abusing the standard of Liberty,
Equality, and Fraternity, have violated our Fatherland
and oppressed our fellow citizens. They have acted
contrary to the ideals of humanity and justice • 15
Next, he bitterly denounced the French saying that
In the field of politics, they have deprived our
translation of Vietnamese linguists on Patti's staff and that of
English educated Vietnamese translators present on that occasion.
13

Ibid.

Chen, Appendix II - Declaration of Independence of the
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, 356; he quotes from Ho Chi Minh,
Selected Works (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961,
Vol. III).
14

15

---

Ibid., 356.
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people of every democratic liberty. They have enforced
inhuman laws; they have set up three distinct political
regimes • • • to wreck our national unity and prevent
our people from being united. They have built more
prisons than schools • • . , fettered public opinion
. • • , forced us to use opium and alcohol • • • ,
fleeced us • • • , impoverished our people • • • ,
robbed us of our rice fields, our mines, our forests,
and our raw materials . • • , monopolized the issuing
of bank notes and the export trade . • . , invented
numerous unjustifiable taxes and reduced our people,
�specially our peasantry, to a state of extreme poverty
. • . ,
hampered the prospering of our national
bourgeoisie; they have mercilessly exploited our
workers.16
Recognizing prophetically that the French would
continue to oppose Vietnamese independence, Ho warned his
people that
From the autumn of 1940, our country had in fact
ceased to be a French colony and had become a
Japanese possession. . • • The truth is that we have
wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from
the French.17
In

closing,

Ho

appealed

to

the

Allies,

who

had

acknowledged the principles of self-determination and
equality of nations at Teheran and San Francisco. "Viet-Nam
has the right to be a free and independent country - and in
fact is so already. 1118
After Ho's speech, Giap spoke to the assembled crowd.
He knew that the revolution had come too quickly and that it
had not

yet

many divisive

been

tendencies

� Ibid., 356-357.
17

Ibid., 358.

18

Ibid., 359.

adequately
in

tested.

He

Vietnamese

understood

society,

so

the
his
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He later wrote, "Uncle

speech stressed unity over and over.

[Ho Chi Minh] always insisted on our paying particular
attention to the question of national unity. 1119
As if to highlight the independence ceremony and
validate to the Vietnamese people that the new Democratic
Republic of Vietnam had Allied backing, two American fighter
planes overflew the celebration with their white-starred
insignia plainly visible.
declaring

this

flyby

The Viet Minh wasted no time in

was

proof

that

States government supported their regime.

the

United

The truth,

however, is that this coincidence was probably brought on by
pilot curiosity. 20
Patti left Hanoi on September 4 for Kunming, where he
reported on the momentous events of September 2 to his
superiors.

Apparently, no one in the

to Ho's Declaration of Independence.

oss paid any attention
Patti returned to

Hanoi a few days later when, on September 13, he learned
that the

oss was shutting down its operations in Kunming and

would be moving its headquarters to Shanghai.

On September

25 Patti was informed that President Truman had signed
Executive Order 9620 terminating the Office of Strategic
Services effective October 1, 1945.n
Giap, 61. The term "Uncle," used in reference to Ho, was
an indication of both familiarity and respect.
19

20

Dunn, 22.

21

Patti, 328 & 353.
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On September 30, his last night in Hanoi, Patti was
Giap was there but left

invited to have dinner with Ho.
shortly after the meal was over.

Ho expressed his

uneasiness that the United states would stand by and let the
French reimpose colonial rule over Vietnam.

He hoped that

the United States could restrain the French because
colonialism was a thing of the past.

Ho also expressed

great concern about the Chinese occupation forces, as he
feared they would loot Vietnam and exacerbate the country's
poverty.22
He

For the first time Ho told Patti about his past.

mentioned that he had two brothers and a sister and that he
had been close to his mother.
into

the

night

with

Ho

Their conversation lasted far

finally

telling

Patti

that

the Vietnamese would "long remember the United States as a
friend and ally."23
reports.

Patti included this information in his

Whether or not it was noticed is unknown.

In any

event, American policy towards Vietnam remained inchoate.
Patti stated flatly that "Theater headquarters and the
American Embassy were unimpressed with my early reports on
the nature and significance of the Viet Minh."M

n Ibid., 366-370.
23

Ibid., 374.

24

Ibid., 125.

CHAPTER X
THE OSS TEAM IN SAIGON
The situation in Cochinchina in the late summer of 1945
was different from that in the north.

In Tonkin the Viet

Minh's control was unchallenged, but in the south other
groups were vying for power.
there

were

and Dai Vet.

Besides the Communist Party,

the Trotskyites, and the pro-Japanese Phuc Quoc
The Cao Dai and Hoa Hao were powerful

politico-religious sects and were probably the best
organized of all the political parties, including the Viet
They decided to support Ho for two reasons.

Minh.

Both

realized that the Viet Minh were stronger and had a fear of
becoming politically isolated.

The Communist Party seemed

to have the best program for Vietnam's future. 1
The Viet Minh

"welcomed

all

political elements,

ethnic groups, national minorities, women, and social
classes in a
Communists,

democratic

front."2

The

southern

however, resisted any association with non

Communist parties. Thus,

because of the geographical

separation of Cochinchina, Annam, and Tonkin, the Communist
Party in the south was somewhat isolated from the Central
Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party in the north
during the war years.
1

Patti, 184.

2

Ibid.

This changed at the August 13 Tan
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Trao Conference when Ho and his men asserted their control. 3
On August 25, the Viet Minh set up the Committee for
the South to function as Cochinchina•s first native
government.
peaceably.

It took over power in Saigon swiftly and
Headed by Tran Van Giau, its first aim was to

main�ain order, as it was determined
impression

on

the

to

make

a

good

Allied representatives expected to

arrive within the next few days. Both the French and the
Trotskyites rejected its pleas for peace.

The

Trotskyites,

who were hostile towards the Viet Minh, continued to preach
"immediate and violent revolution" because they were opposed
to French rule under any guise and felt that Ho Chi Minh had
betrayed the cause for independence. 4
Meanwhile, the

Japanese in

Saigon made

no effort

to

assist the French in regaining control over their colony.
They did nothing to prevent the spread of Viet Minh
authority.

Decoux, who was being held in captivity at Loe

Ninh, about 75 miles north of Saigon, urged General
Tsuchihashi to release him and his
that

only

dealing,

the
[and)

French

could "maintain

safeguard

Tsuchihashi refused.

compatriots.

the

order,

currency. 115

He

argued

ban

arms

General

In the meantime the Japanese released

arms and equipment to the Viet Minh because they hoped to
3

Ibid.

4

R. H. Smith, 337; Patti, 524.

5

Decoux, 340.
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provoke fighting between the Vietnamese and the Allies. 6
A seven member oss team arrived in Saigon on September
2-3, 1945.

Its

commander

was

twenty-eight-year-old

Major A. Peter Dewey, an officer of extraordinarily broad
experience and

accomplishments.

conservative, an
Republican

anti-New

from Chicago.

His

Dealer

father

and

an

had

been

a

isolationist

Dewey's father, like Patti's, was

a friend of "Wild Bill" Donovan.

Dewey, fluent in French,

had fought with the Polish army in France against the
Germans in 1940.

He joined the American army in 1942 and

served as an intelligence officer in Africa and Arabia.
1943 he became a member of the oss while in Algiers.

In

In

1944 he led a mission behind the lines in southern France
that led to the capture of 400 Germans. 7
Dewey and his team were on their own.

He could expect

no logistical or military help from the British.

His

primary mission was to free American POW's who were being
held in the area, but he and the team also had instructions
to search for air crews that had disappeared in action over
Indochina, survey American missionary property in Indochina,
locate and inventory

all

property

of

the

United

States

government, investigate war crimes against the Allies,
identify and track down Japanese war criminals, confiscate
F. c. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and
Fall, 1937-45 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 398.
6

7

R. H. Smith, 337-338.
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or microfilm all Japanese documents and code books, and,
most important, conduct political surveillance for the State
Department.8
After being headquartered on the outskirts of the city
in an old mansion owned by the President of the Bank of
Indochina and occupied during the war by a Japanese admiral,
they quickly located over 4,500 Allied POW's, of which 214
were Americans.

They managed to have the American POW's

evacuated by September 6.

At that time they were ordered to

"remain in Saigon to 'represent American interests.'" 9
On September 12 the first British troops, Indian
Gurkhas, arrived in Saigon.

A small contingent of French

paratroopers accompanied them.

Many of them wore American

issue uniforms which made it difficult to distinguish them
from Americans.
6

with

the

SLFEO agents, who had arrived on September

British

Force

136

from

India,

met

the

paratroopers and took them directly to the ammunition dumps,
the port facilities, and military warehouses where they
relieved the Japanese and took control.

The French then

directed the Japanese prison commander to free several
hundred Legionnaires, officers, and NCO's.

These newly

freed men were taken to the arsenals, armed,
instructed

to

scatter

throughout

the

and

city

8

Patti, 272; R. H. Smith, 338; Spector, 65.

9

R. H. Smith, 338.

to organize
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French citizens for taking over Saigon. 10
Major General Douglas D. Gracey of the British Army
arrived in Saigon on September 13 with the rest of his
troops - 1,800 officers and men.
British colonial officer.

Gracey was a traditional

As far as he was

concerned,

Indochina had been a French colony before the war, and he
was determined to return it to France because colonial
peoples do not "declare themselves independent without the
As General Chennault wrote

consent of their rulers. 1111

several years later, "The British . . . were determined then
to uphold the colonial system in the orient and regarded a
French defeat in Indochina as injurious to their
imperial

prestige. 1112

own

Within hours of his arrival, Gracey

ordered the Japanese to disarm the Vietnamese and to
dislodge the Committee for the South from the Governor
General's Palace in Saigon.

The French lost no time in

hoisting the French flag over public buildings. 13
Dewey had been in constant contact with members of the
Committee for the South since his arrival.

He tried to act

as a liaison between the French and Vietnamese, but the
French blocked

most

of

his

efforts.

Negotiations

broke

w Patti, 298-299.
11

Ibid., 308.

Claire Lee Chennault, Way of a Fighter, edited by Robert
Holtz (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), 342.
12

13

Patti, 309.
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down completely following Gracey•s orders to disarm the
Vietnamese.

Gracey put pressure on Dewey to break off

meetings with the Committee of the South because the
Vietnamese might interpret his actions as "evidence of
official American support for the independence movement. "14
On September 14 Gracey ordered the

oss team to "cease all

intelligence activities until its

mission in Saigon was

'clarified. '" 15

Dewey ignored this order.

In response to Gracey's crackdown, the Committee for
the South

called for

a general strike

on September 17.

Jean Cedile, the High Commissioner of France for Indochina,
asked Gracey for permission to arm some 1400 French POW's,
who had been in prison since the March 9th coup.
turned him down.

Gracey

Instead, Gracey ordered the local Japanese

commander, Field Marshall Terauchi Hisaichi, to take action
to restore

order, even if his troops had to fire upon the

Vietnamese.

Meanwhile, Cedile approached Dewey and asked

for his good offices in persuading the Viet Minh leaders to
end the strike. 16
Dewey met with Giau and others on the night of
September 18.

They told Dewey that it was too late for

further cooperation.
Vietnamese press.
14

Spector, 6 7 .

15

Ibid.

16

Patti, 311-312.

The next day Gracey shut down the

During the ensuing twenty-four hours
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there were many acts
and

assault.

law.

of

sabotage,

vandalism,

plunder,

On September 21 Gracey proclaimed martial

Cedile again went to Gracey and appealed for him to

arm the French POW's.

This time Gracey not only agreed but

also allowed the French POW's to be rearmed.

The French

quietly began to take over the city from the Japanese during
the afternoon of September 2 2. 17
That night, Dewey met with Doctor Pham Ngoc Thach, a
member of the Executive Committee for the Committee for the
South

and

learned

that

they

mass demonstration the next day.

intended

to

stage

a

Dewey cautioned Thach that

such a demonstration was not permitted under martial law and
that there might be bloodshed. 18
The next morning the French began a massacre in the
city.

Cedile's troops reoccupied more public buildings in

Saigon.

As one of the Saigon

oss team members noted

In a pre-dawn attack on September 23, this force looted
the arsenal and embarked on a program of massacre and
brutality against the generally defenseless Annamese
population, secured control over a large part of
Saigon, and became the nucleus of the French forces
which were to later arrive. 19
French troops shot down Viet Minh sentries at City Hall.
Saigon's French colonial population rejoiced at the retaking
of the city and lost all restraint.
IT

Ibid., 314-316.

18

Ibid., 316.

Banding together in

George Sheldon, "The Status of the Viet Nam," Far Eastern
Survey, 18 December 1946, 374.
19
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gangs, French men and women roamed Saigon's streets in
No

search of any Vietnamese who dared to show themselves.
one was spared.

Hundreds of men, women, and children were

savagely beaten and many were taken to nearby jails. 20

The

French and British military stood by without raising a hand
to stop the rioting.
"For

one

that the

As one OSS officer later reflected,

who has been there, the conclusion is inevitable
French have learned almost everything under Hitler

except compassion.

1121

Dewey tried to see Gracey to protest French behavior,
Cedile told Dewey that the

but Gracey refused to see him.

rioting was none of his business and that the Americans were
to blame for the state of affairs. 22

The next day Gracey

declared Dewey persona non grata and ordered him to leave
the country as soon as possible.

The rest of the oss team

was allowed to remain in Vietnam.

Dewey made arrangements

to fly to Ceylon on September 26. 23
The Vietnamese reaction to these atrocities was to
regroup under the leadership of the Viet Minh.
alternative but to wage war.

Frenchmen

were

They saw no
attacked

September 24 and many buildings were burned or sacked.

20

Patti, 317.

George F. Sheldon, "Communications: The Case For Viet
Nam," The Commonweal, 7 March 1947, 516-517.
21

22

Patti, 317.

23

Ibid.

on
The
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Viet Minh and their sympathizers blamed members of the Binh
Xuyen, a gangster-type of political sect, for one
It

particularly horrible bloodbath.

was

alleged that on

the night of September 24/25 the Binh Xuyen entered the
French-Eurasian residential district known as Cite Herault
located in the north-central section of Saigon and massacred
more than one hundred and fifty French colonials, mostly
women and children.
were

An equal

number were

taken away

later tortured, mutilated, and killed.

and

Although

Japanese troops guarded the area, they stood aside and let
the mob pass through because
Vietnamese

aspirations

they

were

sympathetic

for independence.

to

It should be

noted, however, that the Binh Xuyen seldom engaged in any
activity that did not return a

profit, and this atrocity

was totally out of character from
French

intelligence

later

their usual behavior.

learned

that this slaughter

was the work of the Trotskyites.

At the same

massacre,

set up roadblocks around

the

Vietnamese

also

Saigon and refused to let any colonials leave.

time

of

the

Frenchmen

who tried to leave the city were shot.24
Dewey's flight out of Saigon was scheduled to depart at
9:30 A.M. on September 26.

Captain Herbert J. Bluechel

drove Dewey to the airport, where they learned that the
plane would not leave before noon.
learned that a member

of

� Ibid., 319; Dunn, 203.

his

About 11:00 A.M. Dewey

team,

Captain Joseph R.
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Coolidge, had been ambushed and wounded the previous
evening.ll

Dewey and Bluechel visited briefly with Coolidge

at the hospital and returned to the airport around 12:15
P.M.

The plane had not arrived.

They decided to return to

OSS headquarters for lunch since it was only a ten minute
drive.u
Dewey

was

a roadblock

driving

about

headquarters.

five

the

jeep

hundred

when

they

yards

from

came

upon

oss

Both men were familiar with the roadblock and

had negotiated it several times, including that morning when
they left for the airport.

Dewey slowed down to about 8

miles per hour when, without warning, a hidden machine gun
opened up on them at point blank range.
instantly.

Dewey was killed

He was the first American to die in Vietnam.v

The jeep overturned and Bluechel scrambled to safety.
He shot

several

headquarters

for

Headquarters,
several hours.
radioed

oss

approaching
cover.

The

Vietnamese
Vietnamese

and

ran

attacked

to

the

which was not flying an American flag, for
The telephone lines were cut, so Bluechel

headquarters in Ceylon. It contacted the British

in Saigon, who sent Gurkhas to reinforce the Americans.
Vietnamese then withdrew.

Patti, 320.

u Ibid.

v causes, 287.

The

Dewey's body was never recovered.

Bluechel later reported that Dewey
ll

oss
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was ambushed and killed through being mistaken of being
of a nationality other than American. If the jeep in
which he was riding at the time of the incident had
been displaying an American flag, I [Bluechel) feel
positive that the shots would not have been fired. A
flag was not being displayed in accordance with verbal
instructions issued by General Gracey • . • .�
Because the French had been issued American uniforms,
it is most likely that Dewey and Bluechel were mistaken for
Frenchmen.29

Arthur Krock summed up the irony of his death:

Lieutenant Colonel Dewey of the Office of strategic
Services was not meant to perish in the way he did from the gunfire of insurgents in a strange land who
mistook him for a French officer, and therefore a
symbol of what they consider their oppressor. • . •
Peter Dewey boldly met every risk which high spirit,
total absence of physical fear, and hatred of autocracy
impelled him to seek. He survived these, to be shot
from ambush by natives whose protest against foreign
dominion he had examined with the sympathy he felt for
all who are thus subject. It is one of the first
American casualties in the bodeful era of peace-making
that has released passions as violent as those of
war.30
The oss moved its headquarters into downtown Saigon to
the Hotel Continental shortly after Dewey's death.

Navy

Lieutenant James R. Withrow, Jr., a veteran of OSS
operations in India, took over.

Shortly after his arrival,

Ibid., 284. This is a quote from OSS Document MLB-2739-A
dated September 30, 1945.
28

29

Peter M. Dunn, who is very pro-British and pro-French,
claims in his book, The First Vietnam War, that the French were
"outfitted by the British, as contemporary photos show" (p. 215),
but offers no other proof to corroborate his assertion. Dunn is
the only source I have found that differs from other contemporary
accounts, which state that the French were in American uniforms.
30

Arthur Krock, "The Late A. Peter Dewey," The New York
Times, 3 October 1945, 18.

121
the French were reinforced by regular units under the
command of General Jacques Leclerc and began the reconquest
of Cochinchina.

The

oss

merely observed the reconquest and

reported the results to Washington.

Truman disbanded the

OSS less than a week after Dewey's death, and there was
little the team could do but await orders to return to the
United States.

George Sheldon, a 25-year old

oss

officer

stationed in Saigon, was impressed by the Vietnamese
resistance.

Later he wrote, "The Vietnamese have had French

rule and they have had their own, and their stand is that
'France can make Viet Nam a cemetery, but not a colony. ' 1131
The day after Dewey's death, Gracey arrested the
Japanese commander in Saigon, Marshall Terauchi, threatened
to have him tried as a war criminal, and ordered him to aid
the British in fighting
order.
finally

the Vietnamese

Terauchi complied
managed

with

and restoring

Gracey•s

order.

Gracey

to obtain a truce with the Vietnamese on

October 1, but it did not last.

On October 16 the

Vietnamese made a last stand in Saigon.

British, French,

and Japanese troops forced them to abandon the city.

The

first Indochina War had started.n
The American advisory role in postwar Indochina left a
strong legacy of French bitterness and mistrust toward the
George F. Sheldon, "The Case for Viet Nam," The
Commonweal, 31 January 1947, 396.
31

32

Boettcher, 56.
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United States.

The French would view our collusion with the

Viet Minh as one of the main reasons for their postwar
difficulties in Vietnam.

They conveniently overlooked the

fact, however, that Washington had agreed, more than three
months before V-J Day, that the French should return to
Indochina.

The French refused to admit that American aid to

the Viet Minh had been immaterial.

In their

shortsightedness they failed to realize that the "very
existence of the Viet Minh was largely a response to French
exploitation and oppression.

11 33

It would take the Viet Minh

another nine years to defeat the French.

They were

victorious at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954.

It then took

them many more years to defeat the United States and reunify
their country.

n Spector, 72-73.

CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSIONS
The United States failure to recognize the nationalist
movement in

Vietnam in

1945 was

an oversight

for which

Americans, along with the French, would pay dearly.
Minh

was

clearly

an

intelligent,

articulate,

Ho Chi
and

charismatic leader who truly admired the ideals of
democracy.

That Ho was inspired by the example set by the

United States in the Philippines was well known inside and
outside of government circles.

Yet, when World War II

ended, the United states was not concerned about the fate of
Vietnam -

a small

underdeveloped nation located in the

Pacific's backwaters.
Despite Roosevelt's keen interest in Indochina during
the war and his desire to see it placed under an
international trusteeship, Europe's reconstruction received
first priority in the minds of most U.S. leaders charged
with formulating postwar geopolitical strategy.

Also, after

the war, the fear of Communism was uppermost in the minds of
most American politicians and diplomats.

In his "Long

Telegram," dated February 22, 1946, George F. Kennan had
warned the United States that Communism was
a political force committed fanatically to the belief
that • . • it is desirable and necessary that the
internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our
traditional way of life be destroyed, the international
authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to
123
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be secure.1
Those thoughts, coupled with the fact that our aim during
the war had been to concentrate on the European theater
before we turned to the Pacific, precluded any serious
concerns about Southeast Asia's fate or real understanding
of the Viet Minh.
Why did the U.S. go along with the French reoccupation
of Indochina?

First, France had been instrumental in the

success of the American Revolution.

The United States could

ill afford to turn its back on her in her time of need
following World War II.
foolish to ignore

The U.S. knew that it would be

her position in postwar Europe and that

she would play an instrumental part in the reconstruction
and rearmament of Europe.

Therefore, it silently acquiesced

to the return of her Indochina colony, and

Ho Chi Minh's

nationalist movement was sacrificed on the altar of
expediency.
The failure of influential men such as Dean Acheson and
John Foster Dullas to see the nationalistic motives of
either Mao Tse-Tung or Ho Chi Minh was a major part of the
"Red Scare" that pervaded the United States during the
immediate postwar
Domino

era.

Ultimately,

it

led

to

the

theory justifying U.S. military involvement in

"The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary
of State," February 22, 1946, Foreign Relations of the United
States, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 1946. Vol. 6.
(Washington, D. c.: GPO, 1969), 706.
1
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Vietnam.

High American officials

overlook

Chiang

maltreatment

of

Kai-shek's
its

were anti-communist.

were

willing

corruption

and

to

France's

Indochinese colony as long as they
The manner in which Vietnam, and Korea

too, were divided at the end of the war to facilitate the
surrender and evacuation of the defeated Japanese smacked of
imperialism.
cavalier

way

Little did the U.S. realize in 1945
of

dividing

up

that

its

smaller countries would

result in three major wars within the next thirty years.
Just as the U.S. had done at the end of World War I, it
brushed off the pleas of minorities seeking independence in
favor of continued support for colonialism.
The United States failed to realize that the people of
Indochina had become politically sensitized.

The Vietnamese

struggled not for Communist ideology, but to throw the white
man out.

oss

men like as Archimedes Patti could understand

the new nationalist fervor in Vietnam and reported it to
their superiors, who either ignored the information or
failed to pass it on to those who would grasp its import.
Because Vietnam was not an important cog in the world of
geopolitics, it was easy to overlook.

But how the U.S.

could have ignored a leader who used parts of our own
Declaration of Independence in his Independence Declaration
defies logic and remains one of those mysteries that will
never be adequately explained.
If the events of 1945 Vietnam can teach the U.S.
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anything, it is that independence movements such Ho Chi
Minh's should not be overlooked, even when there are larger
geopolitical concerns which need its attention.

The U.S.

failure to recognize that Ho Chi Minh had the support of his
people led to two tragic wars and ultimately caused France
and the United States much misfortune.
If only someone had paid attention to Patti's reports;
if only

someone

had

realized

that

Ho,

at

heart,

was

a nationalist; if only someone had recognized that Ho's
grievances against the French were legitimate; if only there
had not been such an overwhelming aversion to Communism in
the postwar era; and if only Communism had been seen as a
tactic of liberation for oppressed peoples, the world might
have been different.

History, however, continues to go its

own way without taking note of the "ifs" posed by
historians.
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